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Abstract
With expanding U.S. business operations around the globe, the potential for signficant exposure
to international corruption increases along with the increased risks associated with anti-bribery
laws. Companies who employ citizens of the United Kingdom, maintain an office in the United
Kingdom, or are service providers to any United Kingdom organizations, are subject to the U.K
Bribery Act and may be held liable for unlimited fines and jail terms that increase to ten years.
Regardless of their countries of origin, multinational companies will inevitability be impacted by the
U.K and U.S. anti-bribery statutes. The United States' Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) and the United Kingdom's Serious Frauds Office (SFO), Financial Conduct Authority
(FCA), and Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA) are increasing their coordination to work
together in the areas of common regulatory interest, including cross-border enforcement cases. Any
attempt to assess corporate risk for a U.K Bribery Act violation requires an understanding of how
the statute operates and is enforced.
At its core, the U.K Bribery Act creates four distinct "categories of offenses: (1) bribing another
person; (2) taking bribes; (3) bribing foreign public officials; and (4) the failure of a commercial
organization to prevent bribery."I We begin with a brief discussion of the international bribery
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www.cov.com/files/Publication/0la3d76 1 -b8ca-42 1 f-9932-bOfefO3c4219/Presentation/PublicationAttach-
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problem. Next, because the U.K Bribery Act is relatively new, we provide an explanation and
analysis of the act, along with a description of the SFO's revised policies published on October 9,
2012. An analysis of many of the key diferences between the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
(FCPA) and U.K Bribery Act is then presented. Now that more than two years have passed since
implementation, an assessment of this law's impact is presented. As the world continues to grow
smaller and commerce increases, corporate officers and directors must necessarily become familiar
with the provisions of the UK Bribery Act.
I. Overview
With U.S. business operations expanding around the globe, the potential for significant
exposure to international corruption increases along with the increased risks associated
with anti-bribery laws. Companies who employ citizens of the United Kingdom, maintain
an office in the United Kingdom, or are service providers to any United Kingdom organi-
zations are subject to the U.K. Bribery Act and may be held liable for unlimited fines and
jail terms that increase to ten years.2 Regardless of their countries of origin, multinational
companies will inevitability be impacted by the U.K. and U.S. anti-bribery statutes. The
SEC and the United Kingdom's SFO, FCA, and PRA3 are increasing their coordination
to work together in the areas of common regulatory interest, including cross-border en-
forcement cases.4 Tracey McDermott, Director of Enforcement & Financial Crime at the
FCA, states, "we continue to look at the way in which firms manage the risk that staff or
agents of firms may accept or offer bribes to secure new deals."5 Any attempt to assess
corporate risk for a U.K. Bribery Act violation requires an understanding of how the stat-
ute operates and is enforced.
"The [U.K.] 'Bribery Act' replaces a patchwork of statutory and common law offenses
dating back to 1889 and is designed to modernize and simplify the current anti-bribery
restrictions in the United Kingdom."6 At its core, the U.K. Bribery Act creates four dis-
tinct "categories of offenses: (1) bribing another person; (2) taking bribes; (3) bribing for-
eign public officials; and (4) the failure of a commercial organization to prevent bribery."7
ment/68ac553e-2122-49fa-b270-b38b69ff5215/Anti-Corruption%2OMid-Year%2OReview%20-%2OBeijing
.pdf.
2. Bribery Act, 2010, c. 23, §§ 7-8, 11-12 (U.K), available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2010/
23/pdfs/ukpga_20100023_en.pdf.
3. See UK's FCA Wastes No Time in Setting Priorities; 15% Budget Increase, INs. J. (Apr. 10, 2013), http:!!
www.insurancejoumal.com/news/international/2013/04/10/287819.htm (observing that the new Financial
Conduct Authority and the Prudential Regulation Authority replaced the Financial Services Authority on
April 1, 2013).
4. AARON STEPHENS & WILLIAM DEVANEY, US AND UK WHISTLEBLOWING PROGRAMMES: IMPLICA-
TIONS FOR US AND UK FINANcIAL INSTITUTIONS AND OTHER COMPANIES 1, 13 (2013), available at http:!!
us.practicallaw.com/resource/9-525-9018.
5. Tracey McDermott, Dir. of Enforcement & Fin. Crime, Fin. Conduct Auth., Keynote Address: Finan-
cial Crime in the FCA World (July 18, 2013), available at http://www.fea.org.uk/news/speeches/financial-
crime-in-the-fca-world.
6. JONEs DAY, A NEw WEAPON IN THE ARSENAL FOR THE FIGHT AGAINST CORRUPTION: THE U.K.
BRIBERY AcT OF 2010 (Apr. 2010), available at http://www.jonesday.com/files/Publication/79cd836f-6829-
4b74-bc38-ffcfflec49eclPresentation/PublicationAttachment/f77034b9-035e-45a3-bf41-fl 1708369196/
New%20Weapon.pdf.
7. COVINGTON & BURLING LLP, supra note 1. See Bribery Act, 2010, c. 23, §§ 1-2, 6-7 (U.K).
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We begin with a brief discussion of the international bribery problem. Next, because the
U.K. Bribery Act is relatively new, we provide an explanation and analysis of the act, along
with a description of the SFO's revised policies published on October 9, 2012. An analysis
of many of the key differences between the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 8 and U.K.
Bribery Act is then presented. Now that more than two years have passed since imple-
mentation, an assessment of this law's impact is presented.
As the world continues to grow smaller and commerce increases, corporate officers and
directors must necessarily become familiar with the provisions of the U.K. Bribery Act, as
well as the FCPA; failure to do so may put their companies and themselves at grave risk.
Any attempt to assess corporate risk for a U.K. Bribery Act violation requires an under-
standing of how the statute operates and is enforced.
II. The Bribery Problem
In any of its various forms, bribery, corruption, or extortion takes an unacceptable toll
on all citizens of the world. This research was conducted to provide an analysis of the
U.K. Bribery Act that will hopefully benefit entrepreneurs, business executives, and cor-
porate directors as they seek to conduct business around the world. A deeper dive into
research and thinking about the difficult issues surrounding corruption produced a realiza-
tion that the global and domestic culture of bribery, extortion, and corruption is an amor-
phous cancer eating away at our societies with the very real potential to destroy commerce
between nations and produce destructive global civil unrest. This is not an original
thought; it seems apparent that following the global financial crisis of 2008-09, bribery
does not seem to be a plague likely to go away at any time during the near future. Richard
Alderman, who was Director of the U.K.'s Serious Fraud Office (SFO) until April 2012,
has observed,
I have been following . .. the events of the Arab Spring with the very greatest of
interest. I have also been looking at what has been happening recently in India,
China, Russia, and other countries. When I look, in particular, at the Arab Spring I
see that corruption is one of the top issues raised by the citizens of these countries as
one of their main grievances against the government or, indeed in some cases, the
former government. Some say that bribery is part of the culture of those countries
and that we must respect it. The citizens of those countries have demonstrated very
clearly to my mind that this is not part of the culture that they are prepared to accept
any longer.9
8. We discuss the FCPA in greater detail in a separate article. See generally Lawrence J. Trautman & Kara
Altenbaumer-Price, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: An Update on Enforcement and SEC and DOJ Guidance, 41
SEC. REG. L. J. 241 (2013), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=2293382 (discussing the FCPA in greater
detail than in this article) [hereinafter Trautman & Altenbaumer-Price, FCPA Update]; see also Virginia G.
Maurer & Ralph E. Maurer, Uncharted Boundaries of the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 20 J. FiN. CRIME
355 (2013).
9. Richard Alderman, Dir., Serious Fraud Office, UI, Address at the Risk Advisory's DC Dinner (Oct.
5, 2011), available at http://www.riskadvisory.net/analysis/story/serious-fraud-office-director-alderman-
speaks-at-risk-advisorys-dc-dinner.
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Transparency International has observed, "recent events in the Middle East have
brought into stark relief the desperation people felt about levels of corruption in their
countries."' 0 These events confirmed Transparency International's research "that Egypt,
Lebanon, Morocco and Palestine all suffer from unchecked executive power and lack ac-
cess to information laws and whistleblower protection legislation, greatly hindering citi-
zens' ability to report and stop corrupt practices."" Alexandra Wrage, international
attorney and President of Annapolis, Maryland-based TRACE International, has written
that, when it comes to bribery, international competitors must play by the same rules to
"minimize the 'prisoners' dilemma" because "bribery is wrong . . . uneconomical, ineffi-
cient, costly, distorting of proper incentives and outcomes, risky, and generally unprofita-
ble. It is, in short, a poor way to do business."' 2 Several years have now passed since
implementation of the U.K. Bribery Act. Accordingly, within the next few pages, an at-
tempt is made to document the act's impact to date and discuss likely future
developments.
Much has been written during recent years about the FCPA.13 But, because the U.K.
Bribery Act 2010 is relatively new, less has been written on it, and it may take years to
understand how and to what extent the United Kingdom authorities enforce the act.14
Since practitioners tend to focus on the requirements mandated by these statutes and
germane compliance mechanics, even less focus tends to be given to the subjects of brib-
ery and extortion, the extent to which it is encountered, and the economic analysis of the
law of bribery. In 2011, Yockey observed that "[b]ribery blights lives, undermines democ-
racy, and distorts markets."' 5 Donnelly and Kellogg state that the scourge of corruption
"stretches from multinational firms in the United States, to manufacturers in China, to
farmers in Latin America. It has led to water scarcity in Spain, child labor in China, illegal
logging in Indonesia, unsafe medicine in Nigeria and poorly constructed buildings in Tur-
key, where collapses have killed people."' 6 Transparency International states that
10. TRANSPARENCY INT'L, ANNUAL REPORT 2010 84 (Alice Harrison & Michael Sidwell eds., 2011),
available at http://archive.transparency.org/publications/annual-report (follow "Transparency International
Annual report 2010" link).
11. Id.
12. ALEXANDRA ADDISON WRAGE, BRIBERY AND EXTORTION: UNDERMINING BUSINESs, GOVERN-
MENTS, AND SECURITY 124 (2007). See also STEPHEN YAN-LEUNG CHEUNG, P. RAGHAVENDRA RAU &
ARIs STOURArns, How MUCH Do FIRMs PAY AS BRIBES AND WHAT BENEFITS DO THEY GET? EVIDENCE
FROM CORRUPTION CASES WORLDWIDE (Mar. 30, 2012), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=1772246
(Analysis of 116 prominent bribery cases, involving 107 publicly listed firms from 20 stock markets that have
committed bribery of government officials in 52 countries worldwide during 1971-2007, concluding that
their results have the following "policy implications": "[mleasures that promote shareholder monitoring of
managers (director liability, shareholder lawsuits) may help reduce bribery. Institutions that promote trans-
parency (democracy, freedom of the press, education, disclosure of politician sources of income), institutions
that promote enforcement (police reliability), and measures that eliminate regulatory rigidities may also help
reduce bribery"). Id. at 32.
13. See Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1; see also Lawrence J. Trautman & Kara Al-
tenbaumer-Price, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Minefield for Directors, 6 VA L. & Bus. REv. 145 (2011)
[hereinafter Trautman & Altenbaumer-Price, FCPA: Minefield].
14. See Bribery Act, 2010, c. 23 (U.K); Trautman & Altenbaumer-Price, FCPA Update, supra note 8, at 273.
15. Joseph W. Yockey, Solicitation, Ertortion, and the FCPA, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 781, 783 (2011),
available at http://ndlawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/Yockey.pdf.
16. Francis X. Donnelly & Sarah Kellogg, Understanding Corruption, GW Bus., Fall 2011, at 9, available at
http://business.gwu.edu/magazine/fall20l 1/understanding-corruption.cfm.
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"[r]ecent high-profile scandals have shown that corruption does not always make for lu-
crative profits, but rather hefty fines, damaged reputations and jail sentences. Corruption
also distorts markets and creates unfair competition."17 But, "bribery in business persists,
and is perceived as widespread. Almost a fifth of more than 1,000 executives surveyed by
Ernst & Young claimed to have lost business due to a competitor paying bribes; more than
a third felt that corruption was getting worse."' 8 Moreover, "[i]t is not uncommon for
domestic firms and multinationals to pay bribes to secure public procurement contracts
. . . . Given the enormous influence that private interests wield in many public spheres
"19
As governments devote "huge sums to tackle the world's most pressing problems, from
the instability of financial markets to climate change and poverty, corruption remains an
obstacle to achieving much needed progress." 20 Huguette Labelle, chairwoman of Trans-
parency International, says, "[c]orruption has a devastating effect on people, especially the
poor."21 Ms. Labelle observed that "[e]xperts surveyed for our 2011 Corruption Percep-
tions Index saw public sector corruption as a serious problem in the vast majority of 183
countries."22
Non-profit membership association TRACE International provides multinational com-
panies and their sales intermediaries "consultants, representatives, suppliers, distributors,
agents, etc." with cost-effective training and other anti-bribery compliance solutions. 23
TRACE International reports that since 2002, "[t]he United States has pursued approxi-
mately 2.5 foreign bribery enforcement actions for every enforcement action pursued by
all other countries combined ... . The United Kingdom continues to rank second .. ."24
A. A FEW THOUGHTS ABOUT BRIBERY AND EXTORTION
Bribery and extortion are closely related concepts. Black's Law Dictionary defines brib-
ery as "[tlhe corrupt payment, receipt, or solicitation of a private favor for official ac-
tion;" 25 commercial bribery as "(1) [t]he knowing solicitation or acceptance of a benefit in
exchange for violating an oath of fidelity, such as that owed by an employee, partner,
trustee, or attorney; ... (3) [c]orrupt dealing with the agents or employees of prospective
buyers to secure an advantage over business competitors." 26 Others have defined bribery
as those "instances where public officials (mis)use their authority."27 In addition, "govern-
17. TRANSPARENCY INT'L, ANNUAL REPORT 2010, supra note 10, at 31.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 78.
21. Donnelly & Kellogg, supra note 16, at 9.
22. TRANSPARENCY INT'L, ANNUAL REPORT 2011 (Rachel Beddow & Michael Sidwell eds., 2012), availa-
ble at http://issuu.com/transparencyinternational/docs/annual_report 2011_en/l?e=2496456/1960061.
23. TRACE: ANTI-BRIBERY COMPLIANCE SOLUTIONs, GLOBAL ENFORCEMENT REPORT 2012 11(2013),
available at http://www.traceinternational.org/data/public/GER_2012_Final-147966-1.pdf.
24. Id. at 2.
25. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 217 (9th ed. 2009).
26. Id.
27. Seung-Hyon Lee & David H. Weng, Does Bribery in the Home Country Promote or Dampen Firm Er-
ports?, 34 STRAT. MGMT. J. 1472, 1473 (2013) (citing Daniel Treisman, Wbat Have We Learned About the
Causes of Corruption from Ten Years of Cross-National Empirical Research?, 10 ANN. REV. POLITICAL REs. 211
(2007)).
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ment corruption refers to circumstances where officials demand money for their own ben-
efit rather than the state's purposes."28 Extortion is defined as "(1) [t]he offense
committed by a public official who illegally obtains property under the color of office;
esp., an official's collection of an unlawful fee (2) [t]he act or practice of obtaining some-
thing or compelling some action by illegal means, as by force or coercion." 29
While anti-bribery statutes encourage firms to adopt vigorous compliance programs to
combat bribery and corruption, Yockey reports that "the problem is that no matter how
elaborate a firm's compliance efforts might be, they can do little to curb the market for
bribe demands. Firms report that they continue to receive demands for bribes from for-
eign officials on a daily basis."30
1. Types of Bribery
The Transparency International 2008 Bribe Payers Survey, conducted by Gallup Inter-
national "examine[d] the frequency of three different types of corruption used by compa-
nies when operating abroad," "the bribery of high-ranking politicians or political parties;
the bribery of low-level public officials to 'speed things up'; and the use of personal or
familiar relationships to win public contracts."31
Exhibit 1 depicts the results from the TI Bribe Payers Survey 2008 when "senior busi-
ness executives were asked how often companies that they were familiar with and that
were headquartered in one of the twenty-two ranked countries engaged in each form of
bribery."32
Juanita Riafio finds that many significant economies are greatly compromised, with
Transparency International appealing to "governments and the private sector to renew
their efforts to curb the supply side of corruption."33
Although bribes can be requested from anyone, "the majority of firm bribes are paid to
government officials."34 In economies undergoing transition, where legal systems are less
developed and corruption by government officials is prevalent, bribes appear to be com-
monplace.3s The factors that prior research suggests influence bribery include "national
culture, a country's institutional features, and top management characteristics." 36
The Transparency International 2011 Bribe Payers Survey questioned more than 3,000
global business executives regarding their assessment of the extent of bribery requested by
28. Id.
29. BLACK's LAw DicTroNARY 664 (9th ed. 2009).
30. Yockeysupra note 15, at 783.
31. Juanita Riafio, Transparency Int'l, Bribe Payers Index 2008, in GLOBAL CORRUPTION REPORT 2009,
402, 404 - 05 (2009), available at http://archive.transparency.org/publications/gcr/gcr2009.
32. Id. at 405. "From the BPI 2008 list of twenty-two countries, business executives from the twenty-six
countries surveyed were asked to select up to five countries with which they had the most business contact
when working in their region during the past five years. Only these countries were then evaluated. 0.6
percent of respondents answered the question for more than five countries, and their responses were also used
for the analysis as they did not alter the results." Id. at n.4.
33. Id. at 406.
34. Lee & Weng, supra note 27, at 1472.
35. Id.
36. Id.
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companies from twenty-eight of the world's leading economies.37 Unfortunately, the re-
sults for 2011 show no improvement over the results for 2008. For example, "[i]n 2008,
the average score across the 22 countries was 7.8, which is not significantly different from
the score of 7.9 for the same 22 countries in 2011 . . . . entering the index for the first
time were Argentina, Indonesia, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and the United Arab
Emirates."38
Common corruption takes many forms, including "being solicited for bribes from cus-
toms officials in exchange for moving goods in or out of the country ... [or] falling victim
to extortion, where paying a ransom to a foreign official becomes the only way to avoid
harm to one's person, property, or existing economic interests."39 As an outsider to local
customs, laws, and relationships, it seems to be the retention of local agents who prove
difficult to monitor and "often go to great lengths to hide bribe and ransom payments
from the firms that hired them. Firms are then exposed to vicarious liability (civilly and
criminally) for the wrongs committed by their agents, even when the firms made every
effort to prevent the wrongdoing."40
37. DEBoRAH HARDOON & FINN HmNRIcH, TRANSPARENCY INT'L, BRIBE PAYERS tNDEx 2011 4 (2011),
available at http://issuu.com/transparencyinternational/docs/bribe._payers index 2011/1?e=0.
38. Id.
39. Yockey,supra note 15, at 783.
40. Id. at 784.
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D'Souza and Kaufmann observe that "[b]ribery can occur at several stages during the
procurement process, such as during the feasibility study, during tendering, or when de-
termining bid eligibility; in assessing and awarding the bid; or during project implementa-
tion and/or in re-contracting." 41 Moreover, this corruption has the potential to "distort
the overall structure of government expenditures if officials skew the allocation of re-
sources toward sectors where graft is more lucrative and/or less prone to detection, e.g.,
from social services to defense." 42
2. Who Bribes?
D'Souza and Kaufmann examine data from a 2006 survey of 11,232 business managers
located in 125 countries conducted .by the World Economic Forum.4 3 This survey pre-
dates the U.K. Bribery Act 2010 and the acceleration during recent years of FCPA en-
forcement activity. This Global Competitiveness Report, consists of 146 questions (14
corruption-related) designed to monitor bribery-related issues across the globe and allow
for a comparison of "reports of bribery across firms within the same country, as well as
across countries."44 The report reveals that many global managers "admit that 'firms like
theirs' pay illicit payments in order to secure government contracts." 45 Survey results also
reveal that "approximately 32 percent of managers report that firms like theirs bribe to
secure a government contract; this percentage ranges from 13 percent of firms based in
high-income OECD countries that report bribery . . . [to] 50 percent in low-income
countries."46 "The OECD has estimated that between 5 and 25 percent of international
business transaction total contract value may consist of bribes."47
B. MosT DIFFICULT COUNTRY BusINEss ENVIRONMENTS
The Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index 2012 (CPI) presents an
indication of domestic and public sector corruption and reveals that the vast majority of
the 176 countries covered score below a fifty, on a scale from zero (perceived to be highly
corrupt) to 100 (perceived to be very clean).48 Johann Graf Lambsdorff states that the
CPI "ranks countries in terms of the degree to which businesspeople and country analysts
perceive corruption to exist among public officials and politicians."4 9
41. Anna E. D'Souza & Daniel Kaufmann, Who Bribes in Public Contracting and Why: Worldwide Evidence
from Firms, ECON. OF GOVERNANCE, Nov. 2013, at 3, available at http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=1563538.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 8.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 3.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 2.
48. TRANsPARENCy INT'L, CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS INDEx 2012 2 (2012), available at http://www
.transparency.org/whatwedo/pub/corruption-perceptions-index-2012.
49. Johann Graf Lambsdorff, Corruption Perceptions Index 2008, in GLOBAL CORRUPTION REPORT 2009:
CORRUPTION AND THE PRIVATE SECTOR 395, 395 (2009), available at http://www.transparency.org/
whatwedo/pub/global-corruptionreport_2009. Lambsdorff further observed "[tihe data sources include the
Asian Development Bank, the African Development Bank, the Bertlesmann Transformation Index, the World
Bank's Country Policy and Institutional Assessment, the Economist Intelligence Unit, Freedom House's Na-
tions in Transit, Global Insight, LMD International World Competitiveness Center, Merchant International
Group, Political and Economic Risk Consultancy and the World Economic Forum. The statistical work is
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So, according to Ti's Corruption Perceptions Index 2012, which countries comprise the
most difficult business environments for corruption? Of the 176 countries listed for 2011,
Denmark, Finland, New Zealand, Sweden, and Singapore (in that order) are considered to
be "very clean."50 Of countries having major economic commerce or otherwise particu-
larly significant to the United States (ranked 19th) are the United Kingdom (ranked 17th),
Brazil (69th), China (80th), Mexico (105th), Argentina (102nd), Nigeria (139th), Pakistan
(139th), Kenya (139th), Russia (133rd and perceived to be most corrupt), Iraq (169th),
Afghanistan (174th), Myanmar (172nd), and Somalia (174th).5 TI's Global Corruption
Barometer 2013, representing the views of more than 114,000 people in 107 countries and
territories, disclosed that one in four of the individuals surveyed reported paying bribes in
the last year." 52 Furthermore, "reported bribes to the police have almost doubled since
the 2006 Barometer, and more people report paying bribes to the judiciary and for regis-
try and permit services than five years ago. Trust in governments and politicians is also
low . . . ."s5
To put this into further perspective, 56 percent of respondents reported paying a bribe
during 2009 to at least one of nine service providers in Liberia, Uganda, Sierra Leone,
Nigeria, Senegal, Cameroon, Kenya, or Ghana. 54 Regarding the link between poverty
and corruption, Lambsdorff observes that "a simple plot reveals a close association be-
tween a good performance in the CPI 2008 and income per head. This is in line with
academic research."55
Timothy Fort and Cindy Schipani conducted research, finding "a nearly perfect corre-
lation between corruption and violence in countries around the world. The more corrupt
a regime, the more likely it was to resolve disputes through violence." 56 Furthermore,
"the violence doesn't just flow from rulers, said Fort. Sometimes the populace is so frus-
carried out at the University of Passau, and . . . [tlhe strength of the CPI lies in its combination of multiple
data sources in a single index, so that erratic findings from one source can be balanced by at least two other
sources. This reduces the probability of misrepresenting a country's perceived level of corruption. Involving
local business people and country analysts alongside non-resident experts is also an advantage. It makes it
possible to recognize the specificities of local customs through the views of local experts, while at the same
time enhancing the consistency of judgment across countries by involving non-residents. The high correla-
tion between the different sources used in the CPI indicates that methodological differences between sources
have only a minor impact on the findings. In an area in which objective data is not available, such an ap-
proach helps our understanding of real levels of corruption." Id; see also Seung-Hyun Lee, et. al., Why Do
Firms Bribe?, 50 MGMT. INT'L REv. 775 (2010).
50. TRANSPARENCY INT'L, CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS INDEx 2012, supra note 48.
51. Id.
52. TRANSPARENCY INT'L, GLOBAL CORRUPTION BAROMETER 2013 3 (2013), available at http://www
.transparency.org/whatwedo/pub/global-corruption-barometer_-2013.
53. TRANSPARENCY INT'L, ANNUAL REPORT 2010, supra note 10, at 83.
54. Id. at 82.
55. Riafio, supra note 31, at 395.
56. Timothy L. Fort, Corruption Spawns Violence, GW Bus., Fall 2011, at 11, 11, available at http://busi-
ness.gwu.edu/magazine/fall2011/understanding-corruption.cfn; see generally Cindy A. Schipani & Timothy
L. Fort, Adapting Corporate Governance for Sustainable Peace, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 377 (2003), available
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=373182; Cindy A. Schipani & Timothy L. Fort, The Role of the Corporation in
Fostering Sustainable Peace, 35 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 389 (2002), available at http://ssm.com/ab-
stract=303316; Cindy A. Schipani & Timothy L. Fort, Ecology and Violence: The Environmental Dimensions of
War (William Davidson Institute, Working Paper No. 698, 2004), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=555824.
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trated by corrupt leaders that their resentment finally explodes in a physical act. The
uprising that has spread across Arab countries began [during 2010] with resistance against
the corrupt leadership of Tunisia."57 Weiner and Jeong find that "for countries that have
criminalized foreign bribery on their own or by adopting the international convention,
regardless of enforcement activities, their firms were less likely to pay bribes."58 Weiner
and Jeong also found that "private companies were more likely to pay bribes than public
corporations. 'I thought the type of firm wouldn't make a difference, but it did,' Weiner
said." 59 Weiner continues, "'Companies listed on stock exchanges . . . get a lot more
scrutiny. Privately-held companies don't have to provide the same breadth of information
and face the same scrutiny and are more likely to pay bribes' . . . quality research on
corruption is difficult ... it requires data about activities that happen in the shadows." 60 A
few thoughts about the operating environment in several particularly significant countries
follow.
a. China
China may be considered "the new frontier for entrepreneurship . .. perceived to be a
logical primary source of economical manufacturing, raw materials, component parts ...
[and as] a major end market. China may also represent the most likely future competition
for many American industries as well as our major trading partner."61 "Increased com-
merce between the United States and The People's Republic of China (PRC) demands" 62
that those wishing to conduct business there understand that the business environment is
fundamentally different in the PRC because
the Chinese environment differs from that familiar to those experienced in the ways
of American or European governance. For example . . . there is no law protecting
private property as we know it, and the functions of true "free economic markets"
(securities or goods and services) have neither been understood nor embraced by offi-
cials having a natural cultural instinct for governmental control of economic
enterprises. 63
Increasingly closer economic relations make the co-dependence between China and the
remainder of the world inevitable. China is now the largest trading partner with the
United States, in terms of trade balance, and ranks first in terms of imports into the
United States.64 China is the world's second largest economy, with annual growth averag-
57. Timothy L. Fort, supra note 56, at II.
58. Robert J. Weiner, International Law Can Deter Corruption, GW Bus., Fall 2011, at 12, 12, available at
http://business.gwu.edu/magazine/fall201 1/understanding-corruption.cfm.
59. Id. at 13.
60. Id.
61. Lawrence J. Trautman, American Entrepreneur in China: Potholes and Roadblocks on the Silk Road to Pros-
perity, 12 WAKE FORESTJ. Bus. & INTELL. PROP. L. 425, 427 (2012).
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. See Press Release, U.S. Census Bureau & U.S. Bureau of Econ. Analysis, U.S. Dep't of Commerce,
U.S. International Trade in Goods and Services December 2013 (Feb. 6, 2014), available at http://www.census
.gov/foreign-trade/Press-Release/current-press-release/ft900.pdf; see also Angel Gonzalez & Ryan Dezember,
Sinopec Enters US. Shale, WALL ST. J. (an. 4, 2012), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB1000142405297
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ing 10 percent during the past three decades.65 During 2010, "China surpassed Japan as
the world's second largest economy."66 China's growth rate and its potential for wealth
creation "still stands out against other major economies in the world, and it will remain a
key engine for world economic recovery from a middle and long term perspective."'6 7
Nobel laureate and Columbia University economics professor, Robert Mundell, predicts
that, during late 2012, "China's annual future growth would average 7 to 8 percent, rather
than the 10 to 11 percent of recent years."68 The World Bank and Development Research
Center of the State Council, the People's Republic of China report during 2013 that
"[e]ven if growth moderates, China is likely to become a high-income economy and the
world's largest economy before 2030, not-withstanding the fact that its per capita income
would still be a fraction of the average in advanced economies." 69
China's recent "dramatic economic growth . . . makes it difficult to understand that the
beginning of relevant, modern Chinese legal development dates back only to 1979, with
the Law of the People's Republic of China ("Chinese Company Law") adopted in 1993."70
"Even more astounding, the modern roller-coaster development of Chinese securities
markets is an economic experiment materially just twenty-something years old."7 I Profes-
sor Donald C. Clarke highlights the important need for scholarly research about compar-
ative corporate governance, given that "the last thirty years have seen a startling rise in the
economic importance of other countries, particularly China and the rest of non-Japan
Asia." 72
Of concern, "[a] series of alleged accounting frauds. . . at little-known Chinese compa-
nies listed in the U.S. has triggered a sharp shift in sentiment among investors, who are
now worried about hidden business risks or financial problems."7 3 The Wall Street.Journal
0203550304577138493192325500 (example of almost daily announcements illustrating increased investment
by Chinese in U.S.).
65. THE WORLD BANK & DEv. RESEARCH CTR. OF THE STATE COUNCIL, CHINA, CHINA 2030: BUILD-
[NG A MODERN, HARMONIOUS, AND CREATIVE SocuErv xxi (2013), available at http://www-wds.worldbank
.org/external/defaultWDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2013/03/27/0003 50881 20130327163105/Rendered/
PDF/762990PUBOchinaOBox374372BOOPUBLICO.pdf; see generally PETER NOLAN, CHINA AND THE
GLOBAL ECONOMY: NATIONAL CHAMPIONS, INDUSTRIAL POLICY AND THE BIG BUSINESS REVOLUTION
(2001); BARRY NAUGHTON, THE CHINESE ECONOMY: TRANSITIONS AND GROWTH (2007); C. FRED BERG-
STEN, ET. AL., CHINA: THE BALANCE SHEET, WHAT THE WORLD NEEDS TO KNOW Now ABOUT THE
EMERGING SUPERPOWER (2006); Luca Zan & Qingmei Xue, Budgeting China: Macro-Policies and Micro-Prac-
tices in Public Sector Changes, 24 AccT., AuDrnTNG & ACCOUNTABILITY J. 38 (2011).
66. Trautman,supra note 61, at 428 (citing Chester Dawson & Jason Dean, Rising China Bests A Shrinking
Japan, WALL ST. J., Feb. 14, 2011, at Al.
67. Economy Slows to Improve Endurance, Quality, CHINA DAILY (uly 31, 2013, 9:25 AM), http://www
.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2013-07/3 1/content_16855367.htm.
68. Wie Tian, China 'Essential to European Recovery', CHINA DAILY (Nov. 27, 2012, 9:23 AM), http://www
.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2012-11/27/content_16059659.htm.
69. THE WORLD BANK & DEv. RESEARCH CTR. OF THE STATE COUNCIL, CHINA, supra note 65, at xxi.
70. Trautman,supra note 61, at 428 (citing GD MINKANG, UNDERSTANDING CHINESE COMPANY LAW 5 -
8 (2006)).
71. Id. (citing CARL E. WALTER & FRASER J.T. HOWIE, PRIVATIZING CHINA: INSIDE CHINA'S STOCK
MARKETS 5-43 (2006)). See also William Kazer, China Tightens, But Bank Credit Weathers Crunch, WALL ST.
J., July 15, 2013, at C5.
72. Donald Clarke, "Nothing but Wind"? The Past and Future of Comparative Corporate Governance, 59 Am. J.
Comp. L. 75, 77 (2010).
73. Owen Fletcher & Dinny McMahon, Investors Spooked by China-Small-Stock Accounting Scandals are
Breeding Deeper Fears, WALL ST. J., Oct. 1, 2011, at Bl.
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reports that "[m]any Chinese who have profited from the country's growth also express
increasing concerns in private about social issues such as China's one-child policy, food
safety, pollution, corruption, poor schooling, and a weak legal system." 74 We have previ-
ously observed that China provides a useful example of the difficulty of navigating corrup-
tion in an environment the sheer size of China's economy, further complicated by the
growth in the business and economic relationship between the United States and China.7s
Larcker and Tayan note that "individual shareholders who invest in Chinese companies
are effectively minority owners in partnership with the Chinese government, and they face
uncertain legal remedies if controversies arise." 76 It is the "[flailure to contain endemic
corruption among Chinese officials [that] poses one of the most serious threats to the
nation's future economic and political stability," reports the Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, in its October 2007 study by Minxin Pei.7 7 Pei, an expert on eco-
nomic reform and governance in China, argues that corruption
not only fuels social unrest [and] contributes directly to the rise in socioeconomic
inequality, but holds major implications beyond its borders for foreign investment,
international law, and environmental protection . .. and roughly 10 percent of gov-
ernment spending, contracts, and transactions is estimated to be used as kickbacks
and bribes, or simply stolen.78
Pei warns, "[c]orruption has not yet derailed China's economic rise, sparked a social
revolution, or deterred Western investors. But it would be foolish to conclude that the
Chinese system has an infinite capacity to absorb the mounting costs of corruption ...
Eventually, growth will falter." 79 Writing in the New York Times, journalist David
Barboza reports "prominent corruption cases in China are often the outgrowth of power
74. Jeremy Page, Many Rich Chinese Consider Leaving, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 2, 2011), http://online.s#.com/
news/articles/SB10001424052970204394804577011 760523331438; see also Laurie Burkitt, China Halts Sale of
Some Drugs-Move Over Capsules' Chromium Content Highlights Continued Safety Issues, Cost Pressures for Mak-
ers, WALL ST. J., Apr. 17, 2012, at AS; Lingling Wei & Dinny McMahon, Chinese Investigate Spending in
Scandal, WALL ST. J., Apr. 19, 2012, at Al.
75. Trautmansupra note 61, at 491. See also Mike Koehler, Why Compliance with the U.S. Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act Matters in China, CHINA L. & PRAc. (Feb. 2008), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/pa-
pers.cfm?abstractid=1396267; Jessica Tillipman, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act & Government Contractors:
Compliance Trends & Collateral Consequences, BRIEFING PAPERS, No. 11-9, Sept. 2011, at 1, available at http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfn?abstract-id=1924333.
76. DAVID LARCKER & BRIAN TAYAN, CORPORATE GoVERNANCE MATTERS: A CLOSER LOOK AT ORGA-
NIZATIONAL CHOICES AND THEIR CONSEQUENCES 53 (2013). See also Seung-Hyun Lee & Kyeungrae
Kenny Oh, Corription in Asia: Pervasiveness and Arbitrariness, 24 ASIA PAC. J. MGMT. 97 (2007), available at
http://download.springer.com/static/pdf/773/art%253Al0.1007%252Fsl0490-006-9027-y.pdPauth66=
1392603516_58c739elfe4145942012f95bf51d40ea&ext=.pdf; Seung-Hyun Lee & Sungjin Hong, Corruption
and Subsidiary Profitability: US MNC Subsidiaries in the Asia Pacific Region, 29 ASIA PAC. J. MGMT. 949 (2012),
available at http://download.springer.com/static/pdf/851/art%253Al0.1007%252Fs10490-010-9214-8.pdP
auth66=1392603596 e64b60702ada9f89deb5b5d54e52daef&ext=.pdf.
77. Trautman,supra note 61, at 491-92 (citing MINXIN PEI, CORRUPTION THREATENS CHINA'S FUTURE
(2007), available at http://carnegieendowment.org/files/pb55_pei-chinaicorruptionfinal.pdf.
78. Trautman,supra note 61, at 492.
79. Trautnansupra note 61, at 492; see also Polly Hui & Chester Yung, Another Arrest for Family in Hong
Kong Graft Probe, WALL ST. J. (May 4, 2012, 3:32 PM), http://online.wsj.comnews/articles/
SBl0001424052702304743704577382890980237480; Joseph Sternberg, Falling Out of Love With China,
WALL ST. J., Nov. 17, 2011, at Al9, available at http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SBl00014240529702036
11404577042052509983734.
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struggles within the Communist Party, with competing factions using the 'war on corrup-
tion' as a tool to eliminate or weaken rivals and their corporate supporters."80 Barboza
continues, "[tihis may help explain one of the enduring contradictions of China's political
and economic system: the government regularly publicizes an astonishing number of cor-
ruption cases, yet little progress seems to be made in uprooting corruption."81 The eighth
amendment to the Criminal Law of the People's Republic of China took effect on May 1,
2011, making "it a criminal offence for Chinese companies and nationals to bribe foreign
government officials." 82 The amendment provides that "[i]ndividuals may face criminal
detention of between three and ten years, while companies may receive fines, and manag-
ers directly responsible for an offence may also face criminal detention of up to ten
years."83 For those desiring more on this topic, James Heffernan explores some of the
obligations, both legal and ethical, facing U.S. corporations and the American attorneys
representing them when faced by authoritarian regimes such as China. 84
2. India
In India, large anti-corruption demonstrations and vows taken by many to no longer
pay bribes are reported.85 The Wall StreetJournal reports of one Indian entrepreneur that
explained "the most frustrating problem on his path to entrepreneurship in India was the
bands of thugs who assaulted the workers at his factory site. They would 'throw stones at
the workers, beat up the supervisor ... . We lost one and a half years.'"86 Ernst & Young
reports in their 2013 survey of over 3,000 board members, executives, managers, and their
teams across thirty-six countries that "[i]n India, over a third of respondents feel offering
cash payments to win or retain business can be justified-triple that of Western
Europe."87
3. Russia
David Larcker and Brian Tayan observe that "[c]orporate governance in Russia is char-
acterized by concentrated ownership of shares, insider control, weak legal protection for
80. David Barboza, Politics Permeates Anti-Comiption Drive in China, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 2009, at Bi,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/04/business/global04corrupt.html?_r=2&hp=&pagewant.
81. Id.
82. HARDOON & HEINRICH, supra note 37, at 12.
83. Id.
84. James Heffernan, An American in Beging: An Attorney's Ethical Considerations Abroad with a Client Doing
Business with a Representative Government, 19 GRo. J. LEGAL ETHics 721, 721 (2006).
85. Jim Yardley, Protests Awaken a Goliath in India, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 2011, at Al, available at http://
www.nytimes.com/2011/10/30/world/asia/indias-middle-class-appears-to-shed-political-apathy.html?page
wanted=all; see also Vikas Bajaj & Jim Yardley, Scandal Poses a Query: Will India Ever Be Able To Tackle Corrup-
tion?, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2012, at A6, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/16/world/asia/scan-
dal-bares-corruption-hampering-indias-growth.html?pagewanted=all. See also TRANSPARENCY INT'L,
GLOBAL CORRUPTION BAROMETER 2013, rupra note 52, at 3 (observing that millions of people marched in
India during 2011 "to demand the establishment of an independent anti-corruption commission").
86. Amol Sharma, Bribes, Bureaucracy Hobble India's New Entrepreneurs, WALL ST. J., Nov. 1, 2011, at Al,
available at http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SBl0001424052970204479504576639233537716542.
87. ERNST & YOUNG, NAVIGATING TODAY'S COMPLEX BUSINESS RISKS: EUROPE, MIDDLE EAST, INDIA
AND AFRICA FRAUD SURvEY 2013 12 (2013), available at http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/Navi
gating-todays complex business.risks/$FfLE/Navigating-todays.complex.businessrisks.pdf.
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minority shareholders, modest disclosure, inefficient capital markets, and heavy govern-
ment involvement in private enterprise."88 Unsavory tactics used by controlling share-
holders often include squeezing-out minority shareholders thru sham bankruptcy
proceedings, transfer pricing manipulation, bribery of registrars to falsify shareholder
ownership, and diluting minority shareholders by issuing additional shares to the majority
shareholders via a private offering.89 The Russian government is believed to appropriate
assets by asserting unfounded claims of unpaid taxes and intervene to prevent mass layoffs
and maintain employment.90 In addition, "lack of transparency restricts the influence of
shareholders. Disclosure requirements are weak, obscuring the nature of interparty
transactions."91
Transparency International reports that "[i]t is of particular concern that China and
Russia are at the bottom of the index," and that, therefore, "companies from China and
Russia are perceived to be most likely to engage in bribery abroad." 92 In addition, "[t]he
business people surveyed perceived bribery by companies from these countries to be most
widespread, resulting in scores for China and Russia which are substantially lower than the
other surveyed countries."93
The OECD Working Group on Bribery has been working with Russian officials since
2009 "to strengthen Russia's legal framework against bribery of foreign public officials in
international business transactions. Legislation passed in Russia in May 2011 criminalizes
foreign bribery with monetary sanctions for companies and individuals who bribe foreign
public officials."94
C. RESULTS FROM THE GLOBAL COMPETITIVENEss REPORT
D'Souza and Kaufmann observe that "[t]ransparency, freedom of press, and voice and
accountability directly affect the detection of malfeasance, whereas strong rule of law,
including well-functioning courts and police, directly affects the likelihood of enforce-
ment and penalties associated with the legal and judicial process . .. ."95 As might be
expected, because of better corporate governance in OECD nations and perhaps because
of "cross-national legal covenants such as the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, it would
be expected that firms based in these countries would report less bribery, since they face
higher expected costs of bribery stemming from large penalties and reputational risks and
a higher probability of detection and conviction . . . ."96 Furthermore, "[t]he OECD
Convention created large penalties for firms and individuals caught bribing a foreign pub-
lic official. Until the advent of the OECD Convention, bribing a foreign public official
was only illegal for US firms (following the 1977 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act)." 97
88. LARCKER & TAYAN, supra note 76, at 57.
89. Id. at 57-58.
90. Id. at 58.
91. Id.
92. HARDOON & HEINRICH, supra note 37, at 4, 12.
93. Id. at 4.
94. Id. at 13.
95. D'Souza & Kaufmann, supra note 41, at 6.
96. Id. at 7.
97. Id. at 7 n.8.
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1. Company Size
It should be no surprise that firm size is a major determinant of relative economic and
political prowess. Size differences among firms also influences the cost/benefit analysis
logic employed in deciding whether to make a bribe.98 D'Souza and Kaufmann observe
that "by obtaining monopoly rights, large firms in general may have more alternatives to
bribery available to them than small firms, for example, offering employment opportuni-
ties to family members of public officials and political clout."9 Because they are more
visible, larger firms may believe they stand to lose more in the way of damaged reputation
and lost sales, increasing their perceived risk of making a bribe.' 00 Therefore, it appears
that smaller firms seem more likely to bribe than their larger counterparts.o
2. Foreign or Domestic Ownership & Headquarters Location
From the World Economic Forum Global Competitiveness Report survey, D'Souza
and Kaufmann find that different bribery behavior may exist between foreign and domes-
tic firms.102 Decisions to bribe may be influenced by foreign firm ownership characteris-
tics.10 3 Ties to the home country may influence those subsidiaries with headquarters
offshore, "whereas joint ventures with local headquarters may have closer ties with domes-
tic partners."'10
3. Corporate Call to Action
There can be little doubt as to the importance of devoting time, attention, and re-
sources to the issues surrounding global anti-bribery compliance. Risk consultant Kroll
advocates in its 2011/2012 Global Fraud Report Survey that "[p]rocedures for ensuring
that business practices are compliant with the UK Bribery Act or the FCPA should already
be in place: a well-run business is already operating comfortably within the requirements
of these laws and the only additional requirement the laws bring may be the need to
document." 05
The 2011 Fulbright & Jaworski Annual Litigation Trends Survey of 405 participants
who carry the title Head of Litigation or General Counsel (130 individuals in the United
Kingdom and 275 in the United States) found that 8 percent of respondents that year
reported engaging counsel for an investigation of bribery or corruption, compared with 16
percent during the prior year. 06 A trend of increasing investigations had been found in





103. Id. at 8.
104. Id.
105. Tommy Helsby, Compliance: Why 'By the Book' is Good for the Books, in KROLL, GLOBAL FRAUD REPORT
ISSUE 13 2, 3 (May 2011), available at http://fr.krolladvisory.com/media/pdfs/KRL_- FraudReport201 1.pdf.
106. Fulbright's Litigation Trends Survey: A Little Less Litigation; More Regulation, NORTON ROSE FULBRIGIHT
(Oct. 18, 2011), available at http://www.fulbright.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=ne=news.detail&siteid=
286&article-id=9902.
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each of the preceding three years, while one-quarter of all firms surveyed reviewed proce-
dures as a result of the act. 0 7
4. Significant Cost of Bribery
What is known about the high costs experienced by those firms who must defend
against bribery charges? Between 1978 and 2011, data from 115 SEC-reporting firms
subjected to anti-bribery-based enforcement actions supports a finding that the costs of
these actions were substantial, with direct costs (legal fees, investigation expenses, private
settlements, penalties, and fines) averaging 2.11 percent of firm market capitalization. 0 8
Those firms prosecuted for foreign bribery also experienced a market decline in share
values of "3.11%, on average, on the first day that news of the bribery enforcement action
is reported, and by 8.98% over all . . . ."109
5. Unanticipated Consequences of Anti-Bribery Legislation
While this article is focused on the practical aspects of anti-bribery regime compliance,
a number of commentators raise important policy concerns about possible unintended
consequences from anti-bribery legislation. Spalding observes that "although the purpose
of international anti-bribery legislation, particularly the [FCPA], is to deter bribery, em-
pirical evidence demonstrates a problematic collateral effect. In countries where bribery is
perceived to be relatively common, the present enforcement regime goes beyond the de-
terrence of bribery, and ultimately deters investment.""10 It appears that the developing
nations' efforts to fight bribery are producing the unexpected consequences of "sacrificing
poverty reduction opportunities to combat bribery.""'
m. The U.K Bribery Act
The U.K. Bribery Act 2010 became effective on July 1, 2011, after its implementation
date was postponed twice "to allow companies to put in place what the U.K. Ministry of
Justice describes as 'adequate procedures' for preventing bribery."ll 2 Lord Peter Gold-
smith, former United Kingdom attorney general, has said of the new U.K. Bribery Act
that "'[i]t's wider ranging even than the [U.S.' Foreign Corrupt Practices Act] .... [and]
[iut's going to affect all companies with business in the U.K., even if they're not incorpo-
rated here."'I3 In addition, "[t]he enforcement agencies have greater powers and the
penalties are much tougher than under previous U.K. law. Boardrooms throughout
107. Id.
108. JONATHAN M. KARPOFF, D. Sco-rr LEE & GERALD S. MARTIN, THE IMPACT OF ANTI-BRIBERY
ENFORCEMENT AcnONS ON TARGETED FIRMS 30 (Feb. 28, 2012), available at http//perc.tamu.edulperc/
Publication/workingpapers/1202.pdf.
109. Id. at 1.
110. Andrew Brady Spalding, Unwitting Sanctions: Understanding Anti-Bribery Legislation as Economic Sanctions
Against Emerging Markets, 62 FLA. L. REv. 351, 351 (2010).
111. Id.
112. ChrisJohnson, U.K Bribery Act Finally Takes Effect, AM. LAW. (July 1, 2011), available at http://www.law
.com/jsp/law/international/LawArticlentl.jsp?id=1202499108839&slretum=1.
113. Id.
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America and beyond should have this on their agenda."1 4 The failure of a commercial
enterprise to prevent a bribe is the new corporate crime created by the U.K. Bribery Act,
according to Professors Bruce W. Bean and Emma H. MacGuidwin."15 Requiring neither
mens rea nor actual knowledge of the offending bribe, non-U.K. companies will likely
find the act troublesome because it contains an expansive concept of what constitutes a
bribe, the act has an unparalleled jurisdictional reach, and "the offending act of bribery
need not be committed by an officer or employee of the company, but rather, any 'associ-
ated person' may trigger the new strict liability crime of 'failing to prevent bribery.'"16
Let us first look at the events leading up to adoption of the act.
A. THE OECD CONVEN-ON
Congress directed the President to actively encourage the nation's trading partners to
enact their own anti-bribery laws as a result of criticism that complying with the FCPA
would hinder the ability of U.S. businesses to compete globally.' 17 This effort resulted in
creation of the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in
International Business Transactions (OECD Convention)." 8 Engle observes that the
OECD Convention "in large part tracked the normative aspects of the FCPA.""19 While
progress was made by the OECD and others during the 1990s in adopting anti-bribery
measures, the WTO made no such progress.120 Abbott attributes the WTO's lack of
action to "the political incentives facing major actors .... [with] structural characteristics
of the WTO, its approach to legalization, and its negotiating processes also play[ing] sig-
nificant roles."'21
The organization issues guidance for countries that have international business transac-
tions, including anti-bribery guidelines and polices that have anti-corruption enforcement
114. Id.
115. Bruce W. Bean & Emma H. MacGuidwin, Unscrewing the Inscrutable: The UKBriberyAct 2010, 23 IND.
INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 63, 65 (2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2150256.
116. Id.; see also Alun Milford, Gen. Counsel, U.K Serious Frauds Office, Remarks Before World Bribery
and Corruption Forum 2013 (Oct. 15, 2013), available at http://www.sfo.gov.uk/about-us/our-views/other-
speeches/speeches-2013/world-bribery-and-compliance-forum-2013.aspx.
117. Trautman & Altenbaumer-Price, FCPA: Minefield, supra note 13, at 157; see also Eric Engle, 1 Get By
With A Little Help From My Friends? Understanding the UK Anti-Bribery Statute, by Reference to the OECD
Convention, and the Foreign Comipt Practices Act, 44 INT'L L. 1173, 1178 n.37 (2010), available at http://www
.ssrn.com/abstract=1702470 ("The prime mover for the OECD to take steps to combat corruption of foreign
public officials was pressure applied by the United States . . . which took almost two decades to bring about
the intended result."). Indira Carr & Opi Outhwaite, The OECD Anti-Bribery Convention Ten Years On, 5
MANCHESTER J. I.T'L EcoN. L. 3, 6 (2008), available at http://epubs.surrey.ac.uk/578/l/fulltext.pdo.
118. Trautman & Altenbaumer-Price, FCPA: Minefield, supra note 13, at 157; see generally Convention on
Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions, Feb. 15, 1999, 37 ILM
1, available at http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/ConvCombatBriberyENG.pdf.
119. Engle, supra note 117, at 1178.
120. Kenneth W. Abbott, Rule-Making in the WTO: Lessons From the Case of Bribery and Corruption, 4 J. OF
INr'L EcoN. L. 275 (2001), available at http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=1402964.
121. Id.
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programs.122 Accordingly, "the number of countries with active enforcement of anti-cor-
ruption programs increased from four to seven from mid-2009 to mid-2010." 23
B. HISTORY OF U.K. ANTI-BRIBERY FRAMEWORK
The U.K. Bribery Act of 2010 "replaces a patchwork of common law and statutory
offenses dating back to 1889,124 and it is designed to simplify and modernize the United
Kingdom's [then existing] restrictions on bribery."l 25 This 1889 statute "made it a crime
to corruptly give, promise, or offer any gift or advantage to officials of a public body."l 26
The Prevention of Corruption Act of 1906127 "made it an offense to give consideration to
any agent as an inducement for doing any act to show favor or disfavor to any person, in
relation to his or her principal's affairs or business." 28 Korkor and Ryznar describe the
formative events during the last decade that culminated in the 2010 Bribery Act as follows:
(1) Part 12 of the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act, expressly addressing the
bribery of foreign public officials, was adopted during 2001129 and "expressly codified
the common law offense by amending the 1906 Act to make it a triable offense for a
U.K. national or company to make a corrupt payment or pay a bribe to a public
officer abroad;"' 30
(2) The definition of public bodies was extended by this amendment to the 1889 Act
to reach equivalent institutions outside the United Kingdom; 31 and
(3) These U.K. enactments, served to codify U.K. obligation under the OECD Con-
vention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business
Transactions (1997).132
C. BAE SYsTEMs PLC CASE
BAE Systems plc (BAES) is one of the world's largest global defense, aerospace, and
security contractors, with approximately 88,200 employees worldwide, delivering "a wide
range of products and services for air, land and naval forces, as well as advanced electron-
ics, security, information technology solutions and support services." 3 3 BAES is head-
122. Susan S. Muck, Catherine Kevane, Emily Cohen, & Theis Finley, FCPA Update: Recent Prosecutions and
New Enforcement Tools, FENWICK & WEST (Apr. 6, 2010), available at https://www.fenwick.com/
FenwickDocuments/SecLitigationAlert_04-06-10.pdf.
123. Trautman & Altenbaumer-Price, FCPA: Minefield, supra note 13, at 157-58.
124. Public Bodies Corrupt Practices Act, 1889, 52 & 53 Vict., c. 69, § I (Eng.).
125. JONEs DAY, supra note 6.
126. Margaret Ryznar & Samer Korkor, Anti-Bribery Legislation in the United States and United Kingdom: A
Comparative Analysis of Scope and Sentencing, 76 Mo. L. REv. 415, 434 (2011).
127. Prevention of Corruption Act, 1906, 6 & 7 Edw., c. 34, § 1 (Eng.).
128. Ryznar & Korkor, supra note 126, at 434.
129. Id. at 435.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. (citing R v. Director of the Serious Fraud Office, [2008] UKHL 60 [2], available at http://www
.publications.parliament.uk/palld2007Oldjudgmt/jd080730/corner-l.htm).
133. BAE Systems at a Glance, BAE Sys., http://bae-systems-investor-relations-v2.production.investis.com/
bae-systems-at-glance.aspx (last visited Feb. 25, 2014).
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quartered in the United Kingdom and has a U.S. subsidiary-Rockville, Maryland-based
BAE Systems, Inc.134 Allegations surrounding the BAE Systems case surfaced duringJune
2007, "suggesting that the British arms manufacture . . . had paid more than $2 billion in
bribes to a Saudi Arabian public official over a 22 year period." 35 This allegedly involved
the U.K. Ministry of Defense (MOD) processing quarterly invoices from a Saudi official
that resulted in deposits into accounts held at the Washington, DC-based Riggs National
Bank.136 Largely as a result, the OECD's Working Group peer review process reached a
critical juncture "with the United Kingdom's very embarrassing public struggles prosecut-
ing the BAE case from 2003 to 2010."'13 The U.S. Department ofJustice (DOJ) reports,
[A]ccording to court documents, BAES began serving as the prime contractor to the
U.K. government in the mid-1980s, after the U.K. and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
(KSA) entered into a formal understanding. According to court documents, the "sup-
port services" that BAES provided according to the formal understanding resulted, in
part, in BAES providing substantial benefits to a foreign public official of KSA, who
was in a position of influence regarding sales of fighter jets, other defense materials
and related support services. BAES admitted it undertook no adequate review or
verification of benefits provided to the KSA official, including no adequate review or
verification of more than $5 million in invoices submitted by a BAES employee from
May 2001 to early 2002 to determine whether the listed expenses were in compliance
with previous statements made by BAES to the U.S. government regarding its anti-
corruption compliance procedures. In addition, in connection with these same de-
fense deals, BAES agreed to transfer more than £10 million plus more than $9 mil-
lion to a bank account in Switzerland controlled by an intermediary, being aware that
there was a high probability that the intermediary would transfer part of these pay-
ments to the same KSA official ... . BAES admitted that, as part of the conspiracy, it
knowingly and willfully failed to identify commissions paid to third parties for assis-
tance in soliciting, promoting or otherwise securing sales of defense items in violation
134. Press Release, Dep't of Justice, BAE Systems PLC Pleads Guilty and Ordered to Pay $400 Million
Criminal Fine (Mar. 1, 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/March/10-crm-209.html
[hereinafter Justice Dep't Press Release].
135. THOMAS SIMEON OBIDAIRO, AFR. DEv. BANK, A FRAGILE CONSENSUS ON REGULATING TRANSNA-
TIONAL CORRUPTION - A CASE STUDY OF THE OFFP AND BAE SCANDAL 46 (Nov. 5, 2008), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1295903.
136. Jeffrey Steinberg, Scandal of the Century Rocks British Crown and the City, EXECUTIVE INTELLIGENCE
REV. (June 22, 2007), available at http://www.larouchepub.com/other/2007/3425scandal ofcntry.html; see
also Bruce W. Bean, Further to Professor Alldridge's "Caffeinated" Article: What "Stuff" Did the Professor Have in
Mind?, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. FURTHERMORE 77, 86 n.44 (2012), available at http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/students/
groups/oslj/files/2012/l 1/Furthermore.Bean_.pdf (observing that "The Al Yamamah transaction, for exam-
ple, extended over several decades and involved BAE supplying military aircraft, air defense, and other sys-
tems to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The Financial Times referred to this transaction as the 'biggest sale
ever, of anything, to anyone."' See David White & Robert Mauthner, Britain's Arms Sale of the Century: The
10 Billion Pounds UK-Saudi Deal, FIN. TIMES, July 9, 1988, at 7).
137. Elizabeth Spahn, Multi-Jurisdictional Bribery Law Enforcement: The OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, 53
VA. J. INT'L L. 1, 23 (2012); see also The BAE Files, THE GUARDIAN, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/bae
(last visited Feb. 25, 2014) (documenting, starting in 2003, reports of David Leigh and Rob Evans regarding
bribery of foreign officials by the BAE); Frontline, Black Money, PUB. BROADCASTING SERVICE (Apr. 7,
2009), available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/blackmoney/etc/script.hml (detailing some of
the various bribery schemes).
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of the AECA and ITAR. BAES failed to identify the commission payments paid
through the BVI entity ... in order to keep the fact and scope of its external advisors
from public scrutiny.'38
It now appears that these developments set the stage for ultimate passage of the U.K.
Bribery Act. But several additional steps first took place. First, the handling of the BAES
investigation by the United Kingdom was condemned by the OECD Working Group.139
Next, the DOJ "took action, focusing on the Al Yamamah deal in a 2007 FCPA investiga-
tion. Jurisdiction was rooted in 'the allegation that the illicit payments were funneled
through U.S. banks.'"l40 Thereafter,
BAE Systems plc (BAES) pleaded guilty [on March 1, 2010] in U.S. District Court in
the District of Columbia to conspiring to defraud the United States by impairing and
impeding its lawful functions, to make false statements about its Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act (FCPA) compliance program, and to violate the Arms Export Control
Act (AECA) and International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) . . . BAES was
sentenced . . . to pay a $400 million criminal fine, one of the largest criminal fines in
the history of DOJ's ongoing effort to combat overseas corruption in international
business and enforce U.S. export control laws. . . . According to court documents,
BAES made a series of substantial payments to shell companies and third party in-
termediaries that were not subjected to the degree of scrutiny and review to which
BAES told the U.S. government the payments would be subjected. BAES admitted it
regularly retained what it referred to as "marketing advisors" to assist in securing
sales of defense items without scrutinizing those relationships. In fact, BAES took
steps to conceal from the U.S. government and others its relationships with some of
these advisors and its undisclosed payments to them. For example, after May 2001,
BAES contracted with and paid certain advisors through various offshore shell com-
panies beneficially owned by BAES.141
As the U.K. investigation by the SFO gained traction during 2006, "Saudi officials and
their political allies pressured the director of the SFO with threats of cutting off the steady
stream of military intelligence it was supplying to the U.K., placing 'British lives on Brit-
ish streets . . . at risk."I42 Professor Bruce Bean reported on the "alleged direct involve-
ment of three successive Prime Ministers-Margaret Thatcher, John Major and Tony
Blair . .. ."143 Memories of terrorist bombings in London were still vivid memories,
prompting national security concerns as a rationale by Prime Minister Tony Blair to prod
the SFO to drop the BAES investigation.144 Prime Minister Blair had the following com-
ments at the G8 Summit about suspending the BAES investigation:
138. Justice Dep't Press Release, supra note 134.
139. Ryznar & Korkor, supra note 126, at 437.
140. Id. at 438 (citing Evan P. Lestelle, Comment, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, International Norms of
Foreign Public Bribery, and Extrateritorial Jurisdiction, 83 TUL. L. REv. 527, 528 (2008)).
141. Justice Dep't Press Release, supra note 134.
142. Drury D. Stevenson & Nicholas J. Wagoner, FCPA Sanctions: Too Big to Debar?, 80 FORDHAM L. REv.
775, 799 (2011).
143. Bean, supra note 136, at 86.
144. Stevenson & Wagoner, supra note 142, at 799.
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[L]et me make one thing very clear to you-I don't believe the investigation, inciden-
tally, would have led anywhere except to the complete wreckage of a vital strategic
relationship for our country in terms of fighting terrorism, in terms of the Middle
East, in terms of British interests there, quite apart from the fact that we would have
lost thousands, thousands of British jobs.145
The 2007 OECD Working Group, citing "serious concerns" about "deficiencies" previ-
ously found during 2003 and 2007, issued a critique "in combination with significant in-
ternal British domestic, legal, and political criticism,146 as well as hard law criminal
enforcement by the United States,147 [which] proved effective."l48 As a result, the U.K.
Bribery Act became law in 2010.
D. THE MACMILLAN CASE
The SFO reached a civil settlement during mid-2011 with Macmillan Publishers
wherein "Macmillan agreed to pay just over 211 million in respect of profits earned un-
lawfully at Macmillan's textbook business in Rwanda, Uganda and Zambia."149 While not
brought under the U.K. Bribery Act 2010, "[t]he settlement was agreed under Part 5 of
the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 ("POCA") .... This is the largest civil settlement made
in the United Kingdom in a matter of overseas corruption and shows once again the
SFO's willingness to use the civil asset recovery provisions of the POCA"150 for these
cases. The SFO's discovery of the Macmillan illegal conduct resulted from the World
Bank apparently becoming "aware of bribes paid by a Macmillan agent in an unsuccessful
bid to win a contract to supply primary school textbooks to a project in Southern Sudan
funded by the World Bank's Sudan Multi-Donor Trust Fund."'st Seeger and Getz ob-
serve, "[t]he final point to be made about this case is one that is less welcome: the lack of
transparency. As noted above, the Consent Order providing the terms of the settlement is
confidential and thus even many of its most basic terms are unavailable to the public." 5 2
E. THE U.K. BRIBERY Ac-r
At its core, the U.K. Bribery Act 2010 creates "four categories of offenses: (1) bribing
another person; (2) taking bribes; (3) bribing foreign public officials; and (4) failure of a
commercial organization to prevent bribery. With its expansive scope and jurisdictional
reach, the Bribery Act significantly reshapes the UK's anti-corruption regime." 53 At only
145. Frontline, supra note 137; see id.
146. Spahn, supra note 137.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Karolos Seeger & Matthew H. Getz, The U.K Proceeds of Crime Act and the SFO's Latest Bribery-Related
Settlement, FCPA UPDATE (Debevoise & Plimpton LLP, New York, NY), Aug. 2011, at 5, available at http://
www.debeyoise.com/files/Publication/9d56da80-1Idal1-4e29-bc2 7-4288643df3ce/Presentation/PublicationAt-
tachment/ea922c2f-78d8-46ea-ad2d-69638418aO4e/FCPAUpdateAugust20l1.pdf [hereinafter Seeger &
Getz, U.K Proceeds of Crime Act].
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Seeger & Getz, U.K Proceeds of Crime Act, supra note 149, at 7.
153. COVINGTON & BURLING LLP, supra note 1.
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seventeen pages and containing just four substantive offenses, the scope of two of those
offenses in particular prompted business leaders to voice concerns to ministers and
others. 5 4 These offenses involved Section 6 (Bribery of Foreign Public Officials) and
Section 7 (Failure of Commercial Organisations to Prevent Bribery) of the U.K. Bribery
Act 2010.
Of particular concern, the U.K. Bribery Act of 2010 "applies extraterritorially, reaching
any individual 'closely connected' with the United Kingdom and, with respect to the cor-
porate offense of failing to prevent bribery, any commercial organization that carries on a
business or part of a business in the United Kingdom." 55 In addition, "[plenalties for
violations of the Bribery Act include unlimited fines for companies and individuals and a
term of imprisonment of up to 10 years for individual defendants."15 6 For financial service
firms subject to regulation authority by the U.K.'s FSA (recently replaced by the FCA and
PRA), "adequate internal controls reasonably designed to prevent bribery of non-U.K.
officials are not just an affirmative defense to the UKBA's so-called corporate offense, but
an affirmative requirement for all firms authorized by the FSA in accordance with the
Financial Services and Markets Act of 2000 ("FSMA")."57 Moreover, "in a short note,
the FSA reminded FSA-authorized firms that underlying acts of making corrupt payments
or an offer to make corrupt payments need not exist for a company to be subject to regula-
tory action for lacking sufficient anti-bribery internal controls." 58 The FSA note, in its
entirety, follows:
Corruption and bribery are criminal offences under the Bribery Act 2010, which
came into force on 1 July 2011. The Act consolidated and replaced previous anti-
corruption legislation and introduced a new offence of commercial organisations fail-
ing to prevent bribery. Firms have a full defense for this offence if they can show that
they had adequate procedures designed to prevent bribery. The Government has
published guidance on these procedures.
The FSA does not enforce the Bribery Act. FSMA-authorised firms are under a sepa-
rate, regulatory obligation to identify and assess corruption risk and to put in place
and maintain policies and processes to mitigate corruption risk. We can take regula-
tory action against firms who fail adequately to address corruption risk; we do not
need to find evidence of corruption to take action against a firm.
We have consolidated our expectations of firms' anti-bribery and corruption systems
and controls in Chapter 7 of our proposed Financial Crime: a Guide for Firms. Our
Guide is consistent with, but separate from, the Government's Bribery Act guidance.
This is because the scope of the Bribery Act is different from our rules and Principles;
154. Bribery Act, 2010, c. 23 (U.K).
155. GIBsoN DUNN, 2010 YEAR-END FCPA UPDATE (an. 3. 2011), available at http://www.gibsondunn
.com/publications/pages/2010Year-EndFCPAUpdate.aspx.
156. Id.
157. Karolos Seeger & Matthew H. Getz, The UK FSA Reminds Financial Services Firms ofAnti-Corruption
Compliance Obligations, FCPA UPDATE (Debevoise & Plimpton LLP, New York, NY), Sept. 2011, at 7, availa-
ble at http://www.debevoise.com/files/Publication/ccf8c29f-9f86-47ac-95f5-05c65c607046/Presentation/
PublicationAttachment/a83e7Odc-alb5-4d6d-ac22-2c7034dl 75b5/FCPA Update Sept_201 1.pdf.
158. Id.
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firms should bear this in mind when reviewing the adequacy of their anti-corruption
policies and procedures.159
Brown, Airey, and Baker report that guidance was finally supplied by the Ministry of
Justice on March 30, 2011, by publishing a "43-page document offering guidance to com-
mercial organizations seeking to implement adequate procedures (the Guidance)."160 The
Guidance relevant to Section 7 enforcement indicated that "a 'common sense approach'
would be applied ... and set out six key compliance principles that ought to be taken into
account, namely: (1) the need for proportionate procedures; (2) top (board) level commit-
ment; (3) risk assessment; (4) due diligence; (5) communication and training; and (6) mon-
itoring and review."1 6'
F. U.K. BRIBERY Acr DIFFERS FROM FCPA
A number of key differences exist between the U.K. and U.S. anti-bribery laws. The
U.K. Bribery Act goes farther than the FCPA, criminalizing the payment, offer, or prom-
ise of a bribe, as well as the request, acceptance, or agreement to accept a bribe.162 The
U.S. law only criminalizes the former.6s3 The U.K. law also includes a corporate offense
of failing to prevent bribery and contains no facilitating payment exception, as is found in
the FCPA.164 The Bribery Act has broad jurisdiction in that it expands coverage from
bribes paid in the public sector (under the FCPA) to include those bribes paid in the
private sector. In addition, the Bribery Act potentially extends to those corporations that
have any U.K. presence or contact with a citizen of the United Kingdom. Unlike the
FCPA, there is no exception for "facilitation payments."s65 Potential penalties under the
Bribery Act may generally be considered far more draconian than those under the
FCPA.166 Smaller companies are likely to be more heavily reliant on third-party consul-
tants and agents than larger enterprises.167 Because of their greater reliance upon others
for assistance as they seek to conduct international business, smaller companies may have
greater risk under the U.K. Bribery Act because it covers bribes made by "any individual
associated" with the enterprise.168 Chris Johnson observes that "a company's only defense
159. Id.
160. Simon Airey & Mitka T. Baker, The First UK Bribery Act Enforcement Case: A Sign of Tougher Things to
Come?, DLA PIPER (Sept. 16, 2011), available at http://www.dlapiper.com/the-first-uk-bribery-act-enforce-
ment-case-a-sign-of-tougher-things-to-come/.
161. Id.
162. JONEs DAY, supra note 6.
163. CRIMINAL Div. OF THE U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & THE ENFORCEMENT DIV. OF THE U.S. SECS. AND
Exci. COMM'N, A RESOURCE GUIDE TO THE U.S. FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES AcT 10 (Nov. 14, 2012)
available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/guide.pdf.
164. JONES DAY, supra note 6.
165. See generally Robert F. Amaee & John P. Rupp, Keeping Current: Anti-Corruption, The Bribery Act 2010
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under the Act is to prove that it has adequate anti-bribery procedures in place."169 Deter-
mining the steps necessary for Bribery Act compliance will require a separate focused
analysis because compliance with Sarbanes-Oxley or the FCPA will not ensure Bribery Act
compliance.170
The Ministry of Justice has provided six guiding principles, "intended to be flexible and
outcome focused, allowing for the huge variety of circumstances that commercial organi-
zations find themselves ... . [recognizing that] small organizations will ... face different
challenges [than] those faced by large multi-national enterprises."' 7' Moreover, eleven
case studies are provided to illustrate application of the six principles in various hypotheti-
cal scenarios.172
The Six Principles are:
1. Proportionate Procedures
"A commercial organisation's procedures to prevent bribery by persons associ-
ated with it are proportionate to the bribery risks it faces and to the nature, scale,
and complexity of its activities. They are also clear, practical, accessible, and
effectively implemented and enforced."173
2. Top-Level Commitment
"The top-level management of a commercial organization (be it a board of direc-
tors, the owners or any other equivalent body or person) are committed to
preventing bribery by persons associated with it. They foster a culture within the
organisation in which bribery is never acceptable."1 74
3. Risk Assessment
"The commercial organization assesses the nature and extent of its exposure to
potential external and internal risks of bribery on its behalf by persons associated
with it. The assessment is periodic, informed and documented." 75
4. Due Diligence
"The commercial organization applies due diligence procedures, taking a propor-
tionate and risk based approach, in respect of persons who perform or will per-
form services for or on behalf of the organization, in order to mitigate identified
bribery risks." 76
169. Id.
170. Anaee & Rupp, supra note 165, at 1.
171. MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, THE BRIBERY AcT 2010 20 (Mar. 31, 2011), available at https://www.justice
.gov.uk/downloads/legislation/bribery-act-2010-guidance.pdf.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 21.
174. Id. at 23.
175. Id. at 25.
176. Id. at 27.
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5. Communication (including training)
"The commercial organization seeks to ensure that its bribery prevention policies
and procedures are embedded and understood throughout the organization
through internal and external communication, including training, that is propor-
tionate to the risks it faces." 77
6. Monitoring and Review
"The commercial organization monitors and reviews procedures designed to pre-
vent bribery by persons associated with it and makes improvements where
necessary." 78
G. U.K. SERIOUS FRAUD OFFICE
Many outside the United Kingdom may not be familiar with the role and function of
the U.K. Serious Fraud Office and the SFO's enforcement of bribery and corruption laws.
According to SFO Director Richard Alderman, the SFO "is the lead agency in the UK for
investigating and prosecuting cases of overseas corruption ... responsible for enforcing
the current law and . . . responsible for enforcing the provisions of the Bribery Act con-
cerning overseas corruption."179 Alderman continues, "The SFO is an integrated office
consisting of investigators, prosecutors, IT specialists, and support. We deal with both the
investigation as well as the prosecution of cases. The office has about 300 staff and a
budget for 2010/11 of $52.3 million." 80 Moreover, while "anti-corruption is one of the
main areas of work covered by the SFO, [also covered are] serious and complex fraud. In
the year 2009/10, 91% of defendants charged by the SFO were convicted," says
Alderman.' 5'
H. DIRECTOR LIABILrrY
Regarding the question of personal liability for senior officers and/or corporate direc-
tors, Alderman states,
Let me turn . . . to the question of personal liability. I know that this is exercising the
minds of a number of people. The Bribery Act creates an offence of consenting to or
conniving at bribery in respect of senior officers. It is an offence I am very interested
in. I want to see suitable senior executives brought to a criminal trial where they
know about bribery and have permitted it to continue.
Some have asked me what this means for Directors more generally and indeed non-
executive Directors. What does it mean, for example, for US citizens based in the
UK who are Directors or non-executive Directors of corporations based in some very
difficult countries? Will the Act apply to them? What about UK based senior execu-
177. Id. at 29.
178. Id. at 31.
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tives of US corporations? What is their exposure? The Act says that they are within
the scope of the offence if they have a close connection with the UK (for example, if
they are UK citizens or ordinarily resident in the UK).
These individuals need to consider their own personal liability in respect of what
their corporations do. Ultimately, I believe that this is absolutely right. They are
responsible individually and with their fellow Directors for the ethical conduct of the
corporation. If they are unhappy then they need to consider their position. If they
cannot change the corporation's approach then they may have to resign. If they con-
tinue then they run the serious risk of committing a criminal offence under the Brib-
ery Act.182
I. SECTION 7 ADEQUATE PROCEDURES DEFENSE
Debevoise & Plimpton observes that Section 7 of the U.K. Bribery Act provides a de-
fense against a Section 7 bribery charge "by showing that [the company] had in place
'adequate procedures' to prevent bribery." 83 Accordingly, the Ministry of Justice gui-
dance, discussed above,
incorporates Transparency International's (TI) Business Principles for Countering
Bribery and is underpinned by three considerations: (i) proportionality: the level of
anti-bribery due diligence should be proportionate to the scale of the transaction and
the risk of bribery; (ii) timing: if the information necessary for due diligence is not
wholly or partly available pre-acquisition, the due diligence may need to be under-
taken or completed post-acquisition; and (iii) effectiveness: the company should follow
a good practice approach.1 84
J. THE ALCOA CASE
On October 24, 2011, in an action brought under the old law and not the new U.K.
Bribery Act, "two key figures in a bribery investigation of aluminum maker Alcoa Inc.'s
activities in Bahrain [were] arrested, three years after law-enforcement officials began
looking at millions of dollars allegedly paid to gain aluminum contracts." 85
K FIRST U.K. BRIBERY ACT ENFORCEMENT CASES
Brown, Airey, and Baker report that the first prosecution under the new Act is against a
U.K. court official.186 "Less than two months after the Act came into force, the Crown
182. Barry Vitou & Richard Kovalevsky Q.C., Beware: Partners, Directors, Managers d Company Secretaries of
Corporates in the Cross Hairs, THEBRIBERYACT.COM (Oct. 13, 2011, 12:21 AM), http://thebriberyact.com/
2011/10/13/beware-partners-directors-managers-company-secretaries-of-corporates-in-the-cross-hairs/.
183. Karolos Seeger, Matthew H. Getz & Lucy Grouse, Transparency International UK's Anti-Bribery Due
Diligence Guidance, FCPA UPDATE (Debevoise & Plimpton LLP, New York, NY),June 2012, at 8, available at
http://www.debevoise.com/newseventspubs/publications/detail.aspx?id=c97a52f6-8d35-425d-ac8a-a222d7f2c
8af (follow the "View the Update" link).
184. Id. at 9.
185. Dionne Searcey, Kickback Probe at Alcoa Heats Up, WALL ST. J., Oct. 25, 2011, at Bl, available at http.//
online.wsj.com/news/articles/SBl0001424052970204644504576651261805908494.
186. Airey & Baker, supra note 160.
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Prosecution Service (CPS) has charged a Magistrates' Court clerk, Munir Yakub Patel,
with violating Section 2 of the Act for allegedly accepting P500 for fixing a motoring
offense (traffic violation)." 87 The CPS in announcing the prosecution stated that it was
"satisfied there is sufficient evidence to charge Munir Patel with requesting and receiving
a bribe on 1 August 2011 intending to improperly perform his functions."'88 Airey, and
Baker contend,
[t]his case demonstrates that the Act is fully operational and that UK prosecutors are
actively looking for anti-bribery cases to prosecute. As the first prosecution under
the Act, the CPS's decision to charge a court official for fixing traffic tickets may
create the impression that prosecutors will use the Act to go for low-hanging fruit
. . . . [a]necdotal evidence suggests that significant matters are already under active
investigation.189
On August 14, 2013, the SFO charged three men connected to Sustainable Agroenergy
Plc with "offenses of making and accepting a financial advantage contrary to section 1 (1)
and 2 (1) of the Bribery Act of 2010," the first bribery charges to be brought by the SFO
under the act.' 90
L. SFO PUBLISHES ENFORCEMENT "REVISED POLICIES"
On October 9, 2012, the SFO announced revised policies regarding
facilitation payments, business expenditure (hospitality), and corporate self-reporting
. . . to: (1) restate the SFO's primary role as an investigator and prosecutor of serious
complex fraud, including corruption; (2) ensure there is consistency with other prose-
cuting bodies; and (3) meet certain OECD recommendations."' 9'
Accordingly, the revised statements of policy are as follows:
(1) Facilitation payments
A facilitation payment is a type of bribe and should be seen as such. A common
example is where a government official is given money or goods to perform (or
speed up the performance of) an existing duty. Facilitation payments were illegal
before the Bribery Act came into force and they are illegal under the Bribery Act,
regardless of their size or frequency.
Whether or not the SFO will prosecute in respect of a facilitation payment (or
payments) will be governed by the Full Code Test in the Code for Crown Prose-




190. Press Release, Serious Fraud Office, Four Charges in 'Bio Fuel' Investigation (Aug. 14, 2013), available
at http://www.sfo.gov.uk/press-room/latest-press-releases/press-releases-2013/four-charged-in-'bio-fuel'-
investiganion.aspx.
191. Press Release, Serious Fraud Office, Revised Policies (Oct. 9, 2012), available at http://www.sfo.gov.uk/
press-roonlatest-press-releases/press-releases-2012/revised-policies.aspx.
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Director of Public Prosecutions on the Bribery Act of 2010. Where relevant, the
Joint Guidance on Corporate Prosecutions will also be applied.
If on the evidence there is a realistic prospect of conviction, the SFO will prose-
cute if it is in the public interest to do so.192
(2) Business expenditure
Bona fide hospitality or promotional or other legitimate business expenditure is
recognised as an established and important part of doing business. It is also the
case, however, that bribes are sometimes disguised as legitimate business
expenditure.
Whether or not the SFO will prosecute in respect of a bribe presented as hospi-
tality or some other business expenditure will be governed by the Full Code Test
in the Code for Crown Prosecutors and the Joint Prosecution Guidance of the
Director of the SFO and the Director of Public Prosecutions on the Bribery Act
2010. Where relevant, the Joint Guidance on Corporate Prosecutions will also
be applied.
If on the evidence there is a realistic prospect of conviction, the SFO will prose-
cute if it is in the public interest to do so.193
(3) Corporate self-reporting
Whether or not the SFO will prosecute a corporate body in a given case will be
governed by the Full Code Test in the Code for Crown Prosecutors, the joint
prosecution Guidance on Corporate Prosecutions and, where relevant, the Joint
Prosecution Guidance of the Director of the SFO and the Director of Public
Prosecutions on the Bribery Act 2010. If on the evidence there is a realistic pros-
pect of conviction, the SFO will prosecute if it is in the public interest to do so.
The fact that a corporate body has reported itself will be a relevant consideration
to the extent set out in the Guidance on Corporate Prosecutions. That Guidance
explains that, for a self-report to be taken into consideration as a public interest
factor tending against prosecution, it must form part of a "genuinely proactive
approach adopted by the corporate management team when the offending is
brought to their notice." Self-reporting is no guarantee that a prosecution will
not follow. Each case will turn on its own facts. In appropriate cases the SFO
may use its powers under proceeds of crime legislation as an alternative (or in
addition) to prosecution; see the Attorney General's guidance to prosecuting
bodies on their asset recovery powers under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002. If
the SFO uses its powers under proceeds of crime legislation, it will publish its
reasons, the details of the illegal conduct and the details of the disposal. In cases
where the SFO does not prosecute a self-reporting corporate body, the SFO
reserves the right (i) to prosecute it for any unreported violations of the law; and
192. Facilitation Payments, SERIOUS FRAUD OFFICE (Oct. 9, 2012), available at http://www.sfo.gov.uk/brib-
ery-corruption/the-bribery-act/facilitation-payments.aspx.
193. Business Expenditure, SERIous FRAUD OFFICE (Oct. 9, 2012), available at http://www.sfo.gov.uk/brib-
ery--corruption/the-bribery-act/business-expenditure.aspx.
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(ii) lawfully to provide information on the reported violation to other bodies
(such as foreign police forces).'9 4
Lawyers at Morgan Lewis warn that "the revised policies change the equation for po-
tential self reporters because they can no longer expect voluntary disclosed Bribery Act
violations to be resolved "civilly whenever possible." 195 Moreover, those considering self-
reporting "must also weigh the risk of UK authorities reporting their conduct to foreign
regulators."19 6 In the revised policies, "the SFO [expressly] reserves the right ... [to]
lawfully ... provide information on the reported violation to other bodies (such as foreign
police forces).""9
IV. How the SFO Differs from the DOJ
Richard Alderman explains that a number of significant differences exist between the
powers conveyed to the SFO and those of the U.S. Department of Justice.'"9 Among
these differences, the DOJ has the ability to enter into deferred prosecution agreements,
while the SFO currently lacks this power.199 In the United Kingdom, it is necessary "to
prove that the directing mind of the corporate (the Board or people close to the Board)
was involved in the criminal activity. This is unnecessary in the U.S." 20 0 Alderman has
also observed that penalties imposed in the United Kingdom for bribery and corruption
have been lower historically than in the United States. 201 In addition, the United King-
dom double jeopardy laws (based on European and English jurisprudence) means that
corporations and individuals "cannot be punished twice for the same conduct." 202
A. U.K.'s ANSWER TO THE FCPA "BOOKS & RECORDS" PROVISIONS
Mike Koehler has reported that in the United States, "the DOJ and the SEC (if an
issuer is involved) cooperate in and coordinate FCPA enforcement actions. For instance,
the DOJ will bring a criminal action and the SEC will bring a civil action, often charging
violations of the FCPA's books and records and internal control provisions." 203 In the
United Kingdom, Richard Alderman reports that
[t]he SFO works closely with the FSA [Financial Services Authority] on investigations
and . . . exchange material regularly. Co-ordinated action of the sort seen by the
DOJ and SEC has not featured in the UK in the sense of concurrent civil and crimi-
194. Corporate Self-Reporting, SFRIOUS FRAUD OFFICE (Oct. 9, 2012), available at http://www.sfo.gov.uk/
bribery-corruption/corporate-self-reporting.aspx.
195. Eric Kraeutier, David Waldron, Nicholas Greenwood, Lain Wright & Benjamin D. Klein, Serious
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nal outcomes by the FSA and the SFO. The position in the UK is that the SFO will
take the lead if there is a criminal case (whether the eventual outcome is a criminal or
civil one) and the FSA will take the lead if the outcome is to be a regulatory one. The
FSA has power to bring criminal prosecutions but normally leaves it to the SFO to
investigate and prosecute in bribery cases and in cases of serious and complex fraud.
There is a provision in UK legislation (section 221 Companies Act 1985 and now
Section 386 to 389 Companies Act 2006) which deals with the subject of inadequate
books and records. This is a criminal sanction. This provision has been used in the
BAE case. 204
The SEC and the U.K.'s FSA are increasing coordination as they undertake to "restate
their commitment to working together and continue discussions in the areas of common
regulatory interest including cross-border enforcement cases, the oversight of dually-reg-
ulated firms, and the global regulatory agenda." 205 A long and close relationship has been
enjoyed between the SEC and FSA. During 1986, the FSA's predecessor agency first
entered into an enforcement information-sharing agreement with the UK's FSA.206 This
working arrangement was enhanced and refined during 2006, as "the SEC and FSA exe-
cuted a supervisory information-sharing memorandum of understanding in which the two
regulators laid out how they would share information relating to the financial health and
regulatory compliance of regulated entities operating in both countries."207 Former SEC
Chairman Mary L. Shapiro has said,
[t]he ongoing dialogue between the SEC and the UK FSA demonstrates both agen-
cies' commitment to aligning interests with the goal of achieving regulatory consis-
tency. As Europe and the U.S. continue to enhance regulation in the wake of the
financial crisis, working with all of our counterparts is essential to help prevent regu-
latory arbitrage ....
FSA CEO [Hector] Sants said, "Close cooperation between the FSA and the SEC is
important as we seek to meet the G20 commitment to enhance transparency, miti-
gate systemic risk, and protect against market abuse. The strategic dialogue is key to
this and gives the two agencies the opportunity to find common ground, built on
areas of mutual interest, and identify potential regulatory gaps."208
V. Increased Cost of Anti-Bribery Compliance
In our recent FCPA update, we wrote that according to Sharie A. Brown, "the apparent
lack of FCPA compliance attention and employee awareness can be exceptionally costly to
companies with respect to officer, director, and employee time and resources, financial
204. Id.
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and accounting personnel time and resources, and negative press."209 Stefan Zeume ex-
amines the unexpected adoption of the U.K. Bribery Act of 2010 "as an exogenous shock"
to firm's cost of bribing in order to study how unobserved bribes affect firm value.
Among Zeume's findings are (1) U.K. firms that operate in regions where corruption is
more prevalent are indeed more negatively affected by the U.K. Bribery Act; (2) firms that
operate in concentrated industries experience more negative abnormal returns, and these
negative abnormal returns are more pronounced in firms with high exposure to corrupt
regions; and (3) some U.K. firms cross-listed in the United States already subject to the
FCPA are less negatively affected by the Bribery Act.210
A. LAW FIRMS BOLSTER U.K. BRIBERY ACT PRACTICE AREA
A clear result of the increased anti-bribery statute enforcement is the new anti-bribery
consulting and compliance industry. Consisting of accounting, consulting, and law firms,
compliance and preventative measures come at a steep price. Writing in 2006, Brown
contends that firms with major FCPA issues will face expenditures of "substantial re-
sources for legal counsel and representation in connection with FCPA enforcement ac-
tions . . . and face substantial fines and penalties (with individuals also facing
imprisonment) for violations." 211
B. LNCREASED AuDrr COSTS
For those conducting business in perceived high-risk locations, Maher and Lyon find
that anti-bribery legislation compliance means a likely increase in audit fees by extending
the prior research regarding the relationship between audit fees and perceived business
risk.212 Maher and Lyon observe that "much of the prior literature on business risk has
focused on litigation risk . . . of incurring liability payments and the risk of damaged
reputation for the quality of its services." 213 Maher and Lyon find that "clients who en-
gage in behavior that is viewed by some as misconduct incur higher audit fees than those
who do not. The particular alleged misconduct [they] examine was the payment of bribes
209. Trautman & Altenbaumer-Price, FCPA Update, supra note 8, at 271; Sharie A. Brown, Steps to an Effec-
tive Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Compliance Program, ABA COMMITTEE ON CORPORATE COUNSEL NEWS-
LETTER (Am. Bar Assoc., Chicago, Ill.), Summer 2006, at 1 - 2.
210. STEFAN ZEUME, BRIBES AND FiRM VALUE 2 (Dec. 24, 2013), available at http-//ssrn.com/
abstract=2179437.
211. Brown, supra note 209.
212. Michael W. Maher & John D. Lyon, The Importance of Business Risk in Setting Audit Fees: Evidence from
Cases of Client Misconduct, 43 J. OF Accr. RES. 133, 136 (Mar. 2005), available at http://www.ssrn.com/ab-
stract=613121 (citing K.M. Johnstone, Client-Acceptance Decisions: Simultaneous Effects of Client Business Risk,
Audit Risk, Auditor Business Risk, and Risk Adaptation, 19 AUDITING: AJ. OF PRAC. & THEORY I - 25 (2000);J.
Morgan & P. Stocken, The Effects of Business Risk on Audit Pricing, 3 R. oF Accr. STUDIES 365 (1998); T.B.
O'Keefe, D.A. Simunic & M.T. Stein, The Production ofAudit Services from A Major Public Accounting Firm, 32
J. OF Accr. REs. 241 (1994); J. Pratt & J.D. Stice, The Effects of Client Characteristics on Auditor Litigation Risk
Judgments, Required Audit Evidence, and recommended Audit Fees, 69 THE Accr. R. 639 (1994); A.
Seetharaman, F.A. Gul & S.G. Lynn, Litigation Risk and Audit Fees: Evidence from U.K Firms Cross-Listed on
U.S. Markets, 33 J. OF AccT. & ECON. 91 (2002).
213. Maher & Lyon, supra note 212, (citing Z. Palmrose, An Analysis ofAuditor Litigation and Audit Service
Quality, 63 THE Accr. R. 55 (1988); D.A. Simunic & M.T. Stein, The Impact of Litigation Risk on Audit
Pricing: A Review of the Economics and the Evidence, 15 AUDITING: A J. PRAc. & THEORY 119 (Supp.) (1996)).
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to high-level foreign government officials before such payments became illegal under the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act." 214
C. AVAILABILITY OF NEW INSURANCE COVERAGE
The demand for insurance to transfer risk associated with the high costs of defending
against an enforcement action has increased, commensurate with the increase in enforce-
ment. Major insurance carriers have responded with products aimed at covering investi-
gation costs, including the FCPA and U.K. Bribery Act.215 In a speech to the National
Association of Corporate Directors, Kara Altenbaumer-Price, Vice President and Man-
agement & Professional Liability Counsel for insurance broker USI, cautioned that com-
panies should closely consider whether such policies are worth their price. 216 She
observed that many of these products have smaller sub-limits than traditional public com-
pany D&O policies and carry significant price tags.217 Some products designed to pay
certain portions of the fines and penalties that may be assessed against individuals in FCPA
prosecutions appear to cover only a very narrow portion of potential FCPA investigation
costs and penalties that could be assessed. 218 More importantly, she observed, the SEC
and DOJ will often require in settlement documents that fines not be paid by insurance
proceeds. 219
Instead, Altenbaumer-Price recommends that companies consider manuscripting their
traditional D&O policies to take advantage of newly available language that more closely
matches traditional A-B-C policies with how claims related to government investigations
actually arise.220 She advises negotiating the definition of "claim" within D&O policies to
trigger coverage earlier in an investigation-such as changing from a "Wells Notice" as
the triggering point for coverage for an SEC investigation to a Formal Notice of Investi-
gation or simply a written request for documents or testimony.221 She also advises to be
aware of outs within policy language that may exclude significant costs, such as those
associated with document production in investigations. 222
214. Maher & Lyon, supra note 212.
215. See, e.g., Press Release, Chartis, Chartis Introduces Investigation Edge, Insurance Coverage for SEC
Investigations (Mar. 2, 2011), available at http://www.aig.com/ncglobalweb/intemet/US/en/files/PRInvesti
gation Edge03_02_11 tcm295-330316.pdf [hereinafter Chartis Press Release].
216. Kara Altenbaumer-Price, Address Before the National Association of Corporate Directors North Texas
Chapter: Global Anti-Corruption Enforcement and Trends (Nov. 1, 2011).
217. A Q&A Regarding FCPA Insurance, FCPA PROFESSOR (Apr. 10, 2012), available at http://www
.fcpaprofessor.com/a-qa-regarding-fcpa-insurance-2; Kara Altenbaumer-Price, supra note 216; Client Memo-
randum, Wilkie, Farr & Gallagher, LLP, New Insurance Products Protect Against Costs of FCPA Investiga-
tions (Aug. 9, 2011), available at http://www.wilikie.com/files/tbls29Publications%5CFileUpload5686%5C3
851%5CNew-Insurance-Products-Protect-Against-Costs.pdf; see, e.g., Chartis Press Release, supra note 215.
218. A Q&A Regarding FCPA Insurance, supra note 217; Kara Altenbaumer-Price, supra note 216; Client
Memorandum, supra note 217; see, e.g., Chartis Press Release, snpra note 215.
219. Kara Altenbaumer-Price, supra note 216.
220. Id.; see also Lawrence J. Trautman & Kara Altenbaumer-Price, D & 0 Insurance: A Primer, I AM. U.
Bus. L. REv. 337 (2012), available at httpi/ssm.com/abstract=1998080.
221. Kara Altenbaumer-Price, supra note 216.
222. Kara Altenbaumer-Price, Guest Post: Internal Investigation Costs: How Investigations Coverage May Fail, D
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VI. U.K. Bribery Act: Post-Implementation Assessment
After initial concern about what appears to be legislation more draconian than the
FCPA, post-implementation of the U.K. Bribery Act has produced only three "convictions
under the Bribery Act 2010 in just under two years, so far all involving individuals. There
[have] yet to be any corporate convictions or any cases offering guidance on the corporate
offense under Section 7, in particular on the meaning of 'carrying on business' in the
United Kingdom." 223 Mr. Yang Li, a student, was convicted on April 23, 2013, of offering
a bribe of Y5,000 to his University of Bath tutor in an attempt to increase his dissertation
grade (reportedly three percent deficient of a passing grade).224 Rejected by his tutor, Mr.
Li subsequently pleaded guilty (under Section I of the Bribery Act of 2010) to the bribery
charge in Bristol Crown Court and was sentenced to pay 24,880 in costs and twelve
months of prison sentence. 225 Accordingly, Judge Michael Longman observed that "any
form of corruption or incitement to a person in any manner amounts to a serious offense
which must be taken seriously by the court." 226
The lack of prosecutions to date "is hardly a surprise to those familiar with the demands
of an investigation into complex economic crime," writes Robert Amaee, former Head of
Anti-Corruption and Head of Proceeds of Crime at the U.K. Serious Fraud Office and
now of counsel at the law firm of Covington & Burling.227 It is estimated that the SFO
spends
an average of three and a half years and £1.5 million ($2.25 million) investigating
each bribery case . . . [and] . . . [i]n spite of the undoubted challenges that confront
the SFO in the year ahead, it is important for companies and senior individuals to
guard against complacency.228
During the first twelve months of the U.K. Bribery Act's effectiveness, Alderman re-
signed as Director of the SFO and was replaced by veteran prosecutor David Green on
April 23, 2012.229 Rob Morris believes that "the SFO's 'carrot approach' contrasts with
what may be considered a 'stick approach' that has historically been taken by the Depart-
ment ofJustice and SEC, where compliance is encouraged by the impetus to avoid signifi-
cant fines." 230
Mid-2012 statements by Mr. Green "follow closely on the heels of publication of an
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development working group report highly
critical of the UK's implementation of the Bribery Convention, and critical as well of Mr.
223. Rosanne Kay & Kimberly Davies, A Fiery Dissertation-The Third Conviction Under the UK Bribery Act
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Alderman's enforcement of the Bribery Act." 231 Raymond L. Sweigart warns that Mr.
Green has stated, "'[w]e are primarily a crime-fighting agency and we've got to remember
that.' Mr. Green has further indicated that he is looking for 'significant strategic' cases
which threaten confidence in the City and British business and that he is eager to bring
the first 'big' Bribery Act case." 232 Michael Volkov says that "in some respects, the SFO is
having trouble defining itself as a prosecution agency or a regulatory agency dedicated to
continuing consultations to companies falling under UK Bribery Act 'regulation.'"233
Professor Bruce W. Bean and Emma H. MacGuidwin conclude that The Bribery Act of
2010 represents "the unintended consequences of Parliament's apparent need to enact ...
a truly draconian anti-bribery law in order to overcome the embarrassment of the govern-
ment's role in the BAE scandal ... years of procrastination ... and its own Allowances and
Expenses scandal." 234
VII. Importance of the Tone at the Top
To stand a chance of being successful, any corporate anti-bribery and anti-corruption
program requires significant enterprise commitment at the very top. In their adoption of
the Good Practices Guidance on Internal Controls, Ethics, and Compliance, the OECD has rec-
ognized that "[c]ompanies should consider ... strong, explicit and visible support and
commitment from senior management to the company's internal controls, ethics and
compliance programmes or measures for preventing and detecting foreign bribery." 235
A. COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS: PRIORIT A MUST
We have seen previously that bribery, extortion, and corruption in many forms is more
prevalent than not in many countries. Inadequate anti-bribery efforts result in companies
and individuals being subjected to unlimited fines for and imprisonment of up to ten years
for individual defendants under the U.K. Bribery Act of 2010, increased legal and audit
costs, disgorgement of ill-gotten gains, and the threat of massive fines under the FCPA.236
Ernst & Young conducted a thirty-six-country survey during 2013 of more than 3,000
board members, executives, and top managers and their teams.237 These survey results
reveal that an alarming number of respondents "appear to be comfortable with or aware of
unethical conduct. This includes recording revenues early, underreporting costs or en-
231. Raymond L. Sweigart, UK Bribery Act-There's a New Constable in Town, PILLSBURY, WINTHROP,
SHAw, PrTMAN, L.L.P. (May 17, 2012), available at http://www.pillsburylaw.com/index.cfm?pageid=34&
itemid=40557 (citing OECD WORKING GROUP ON BRIBERY, ORG. FOR EcON. COOPERATION AND DEV.,
PHASE 3 REPORT ON IMPLEMENTING THE OECD AIr-BRIBERY CONVENION IN THE UNITED KING-
DOM (Mar. 2012), available at http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-briberyfUnitedKingdomphase3reportEN.pdf).
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couraging customers to buy unnecessary stock. This is coupled with the perception that
bribery and corruption remain widespread in several markets." 238
The loud and clear message that bribery and extortion will not be tolerated must be
communicated by senior management and the board to everyone within the company and
any agents acting on its behalf. Establishing the proper tone, consistently conveying the
significance of anti-bribery compliance, and openly advocating compliance at all levels of
the organization is a special responsibility of top managers, not just those domiciled in the
United States. Middle and in-country managers cannot be expected to have adequate
motivation to conduct their activities within the confines of the FCPA and U.K. Bribery
Act in the absence of a strong commitment from those above. Anti-bribery compliance
must be elevated toward the top of enterprise priorities. These priorities must be more
than mere words, which means that compliance efforts must receive adequate budgeting
resources.
Ann Bruder, General Counsel at Commercial Metals Corporation says, "[o]ur job as
general counsel is to ensure the predictability of results and predictability of cost to pro-
duce those results."239 Finding "a significant perception gap between senior management
and employees when it comes to the effectiveness of compliance programs," the 2013
Ernst & Young survey suggests that the following four issues need to be addressed by
those responsible for compliance programs: (1) "[s]enior management thinks programs are
more effective than they actually are"; (2) "[p]rograms are too narrow or not seen as rele-
vant"; (3) "[p]rograms are perceived as constraining competitiveness in this market"; and
(4) "[tlhe increased risk due to current market conditions has not been matched by in-
creased compliance efforts." 240
B. Six STEPS TO PROTECTING AGAINST BRIBERY AND CORRUPTION
Observing that "bribery and corruption issues around the globe continue to challenge
even the most robust compliance organizations" and that "fifty-seven percent [of survey
respondents] believe bribery and corruption are widespread in their country," consultant
Ernst & Young notes, "we have observed common features among those who manage it
most effectively":241
1. Own the problem.
2. Deal with the issues- make compliance relevant.
3. Communicate the risks.
4. Communicate the benefits.
5. Focus resources.
6. Ask questions, demand answers.242
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C. EMPLOYEE EDUCATION AND AwARENEss
It is a constant challenge to foster and maintain anti-bribery law awareness among em-
ployees and any third-party agents acting on behalf of the company. Yormark observes
that violations may take place "simply because employees were not aware that what they
were doing was wrong."243 Particularly in those troublesome global jurisdictions where
bribery is culturally ingrained as a way of life, consultant Protivity contends that there
appears to be no one best way to conduct employee and agent education because of the
difficulties resulting from language, culture, and geographical considerations. As a result,
many companies are now employing a "multi-method" approach, including in-person,
CD-ROM, and Internet-based training available in appropriate languages. 24 Particularly
where computer access to internal communications is not readily available, managers will
need to be creative in their outreach to rank-and-file employees.
Anti-bribery compliance training (U.K. Bribery Act, FCPA, and local government anti-
bribery laws) should include important coverage about the company's ethical values, edu-
cation about the various types of offending conduct, and warnings about the resulting
serious individual and corporate liabilities associated with related violations.245 Sharie
Brown warns, "it has been my experience that newer public companies that expand over-
seas, as well as companies with in-house counsel, are especially vulnerable to . . . an-
tibribery and internal controls violations involving their overseas business units." 246
The OECD provides the following guidance regarding essential elements necessary for
compliance and ethics programs designed to detect, educate, and prevent "foreign bribery
applicable, where appropriate and subject to contractual arrangements, to third parties
such as agents and other intermediaries, consultants, representatives, distributors, contrac-
tors and suppliers, consortia, and joint venture partners."247 These essential elements are
(i) properly documented risk-based due diligence pertaining to the hiring, as well as
the appropriate and regular oversight of business partners;
(ii) informing business partners of the company's commitment to abiding by laws on
the prohibitions against foreign bribery, and of the company's ethics and compliance
programme or measures for preventing and detecting such bribery; and
(iii) seeking a reciprocal commitment from business partners.248
Brown further recommends that in-house counsel should incorporate with training a
plan "to conduct a risk assessment of the high-risk areas or operations within the business
units that can expose the company to serious ... [anti-bribery] liability and enforcement
action." 249 Sharie Brown also recommends that when conducting field anti-bribery train-
ing, counsel should try to meet with marketing and area managers and auditing and ac-
counting personnel to attempt to flush out troublesome activities that may result in anti-
243. KEN YORMARK, INVESTIGATIONS AND THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICEs AcT 4 (2006).
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VOL. 47, NO. 3
LAWYERS, GUNS & MONEY 517
bribery violation issues. 250 These widespread discussions should help with risk assessment
and create anti-bribery compliance buy-in among all relevant individuals. Counsel should
seek to present a focused discussion based on a previously prepared "risk assessment tem-
plate," tailored to the particular business risk concerns.251 Prior preparation should pro-
vide for a more efficient and productive meeting.252 Officers and directors, employees
having international responsibility and prospective, and existing international consultants
and agents should receive initial training. 253
General Counsel Bruder stresses that in addition to commitment by the CEO, the
attitude and focus of business unit leaders set the tone for the organization. The best
way to ensure compliance is to have business leaders who believe firmly that the
paying of even one bribe distorts profitability. It's a slippery slope, any bribery is not
OK and it makes no business sense to do it.254
VIII. Conclusion
Bribery and corruption remain unfortunate obstacles to economic growth and prosper-
ity. The diversion of scarce resources through corruption thwarts efforts to create jobs
and erase poverty. Companies that employ citizens of the United Kingdom, maintain an
office in the United Kingdom, or are service providers to any United Kingdom organiza-
tions are subject to the U.K. Bribery Act and may be held liable for unlimited fines and jail
terms that increase to ten years. Any attempt to assess corporate risk for a U.K. Bribery
Act violation requires an understanding of how the statute operates and is enforced.
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